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INTRODUCTION
The interpretation of statutes is often a labor consisting more
of art than science, but the project of seeking the best, i.e., the
most authentic and accurate meaning of statutory law, still merits
scientific and careful investigation.' But in the process, it is most
. The John Courtney Murray, S.J. University Professor, Emeritus, Loyola
University Chicago.
I See generally Robert John Araujo, Method in Interpretation:Practical Wisdom
and the Search for Meaning in Public Legal Texts, 68 Miss. L.J. 225 (1998).
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relevant to keep in mind that the words of a statute are selected to
address the needs of society; therefore, statutory construction
ought to keep this objective in view if statutes are to fulfill their
function in the service of the common good. 2 In essence, the
making and interpretation of statutes are elements of the same
enterprise.
Of course, statutes enacted by totalitarian regimes are not
necessarily directed to serving the common good but are more
likely directed to furthering the interests of dictators and despots,
e.g., the Nuremberg Statutes. 3 However, in realms that are not
totalitarian, there should be reasonable expectations that the
common good is served. I am hopeful that the members of the
United States Supreme Court approached the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act with the common good in mind as they
executed their difficult task this past year. 4
In addition to serving the common good, there is another
aspect of the statutory process that needs to be kept in mind at
the outset of the enterprise of explaining the meaning of these
normative texts. The interpretation of statutes is and will remain
a major part of the responsibility of those who uphold the rule of
law.5 While reasonable people may differ in their conclusions
2 By the common good, I mean that there is a just objective for society that can
only be determined by assessing what is beneficial to the individual in the context of
what is also beneficial to those with whom this person deals in their respective
existences. In short, the common good cannot exist without taking stock of what is
proper, what is beneficial for all the members of each community starting with the
smallest and extending into the universal, global community.
3 The National Socialists in Germany enacted this legislation during the 1930s to
promote the anti-Semitic policies of the regime. See AMY NEWMAN, THE NUREMBERG

LAws: INSTITUTIONALIZED ANTI-SEMITISM (1998).

1 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, 124 Stat. 119).
5 As there are many conflicting definitions of the important concept, I offer my
own. By the "rule of law" I mean the necessary reliance on juridical principles codified
in some manner-by legislative act or by judicial opinion-which guide people and
their institutions when their formal relationships raise questions about rights or
claims and corresponding duties or responsibilities. The moral action and the social
conduct of individuals, groups, and organizations have a definite bearing on these
formal relationships. The rule of law also has a bearing on understanding the freedom
of persons vis-A-vis law as a constraint and law as a directive that guides. In essence,
the rule of law is concerned with human reason developing normative principles that
will have general application typically in futuro. The method underlying the human
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about the meaning of a statute as it is applied in a particular
context, there is nevertheless some general acceptance of the
proposal that the meaning of the underlying, principal objectives
of legislation can be agreed upon by demonstrably reasonable
people, most of the time.6 I hold the view that this has been true of
statute making and interpretation in Anglo-American legal
institutions since their respective inceptions on many, but not all,
occasions.7
Even though the term "statutorification" describes a legal
event of relatively modern times in which legislation has become
the predominant form of law, 8 it is evident that Anglo-American
law is no stranger to the making of statutes for the presumed
common good, and this phenomenon is at the core of the society
served by its legislature and the laws which this body enacts.
Although the common law prevailed on both sides of the Atlantic
well into the twentieth century until legislatures finally claimed
their predominant role in the making of law, statutes are by no
means a creature of the contemporary age. Since the thirteenth
century, the English Parliament has been busy legislating for
King, Queen, and country. 9 Sometimes the legislation has
addressed matters of mundane concern, for example standards for

reasoning is based on objective human intelligence comprehending intelligible reality
and formulating norms that will achieve the goals beneficial to the common good, the
bonding agent that holds societies together.
6 Here I assume that each interpreter is a rational and reasonable person
possessing a sufficient level of intelligence to interpret legal texts. Most interpreters
are reasonable people who can agree on the general meaning of the important elements
of a statute; however, they cannot always agree on particular meanings as the statutes
are applied in particular cases.
7 Of course there are notable exceptions, such as the upholding of the executive
orders calling for the internment of Japanese-Americans during the Second World War,
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and the validation of the
Commonwealth of Virginia's mandatory sterilization law, Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927).

8 See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982);
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977) (using a different term for the
same phenomenon, viz., the "orgy of statute making").
9

See J. R. MADDICOTT, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT, 924-1327 157

(2012). As Maddicott points out, the origins of the parliamentary system go back to the
tenth century. Id. at 1-4. After 1066 and the formation of councils, the way was set for
the emergence of the deliberative and legislative body that finally became the
recognizable Parliament of the fourteenth century. Id. at 106.
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wool clothing merchants or coroners.10 However, legislation could
also involve the gravest of matters like statutes dealing with the
commission of crimes such as acts of perjury."
In the United States, the colonial legislatures of the east
coast provide other examples of early statute making. These
colonial laws also addressed the mundane and the exotic.12
Returning to England, the heavy hand of the law was relied upon
to protect the common good by criminalizing the destruction of
dikes, which were erected to protect lands and people from
flooding.13 In all these cases, however, it is generally regarded
that the force of law is founded on some reason, and the need for
civil society to address, in a responsible fashion, pressing issues
that require the formulation of norms that are then codified in
legislation.
One set of English statutes of the early sixteenth century
which has attracted attention since their promulgation is the body
of legislative initiatives enacted from 1533 to 1534 regarding "the
King's great matter,"14 i.e., the circumstances surrounding Henry
VIII's efforts to divorce Queen Catherine in order to marry Ann
Boleyn and to implement the King's wish to ensure national
acceptance of this plan through the force of law.15 Henry was
accustomed to using the legal process to further his ambition, but
when the existing law failed him, he encouraged Parliament to
10An Act Concerning the Making of Woolen Clothes, 1509, 1 Hen. 8, c. 2 (Eng.); An
Act Concerning Coroners, 1509, 1 Hen. 8, c. 7 (Eng.).
11An Act Against Perjury, 1509, 1 Hen. 8, c. 11 (Eng.).
12 For an interesting excursion of laws in early America see LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (1973). One intriguing example of the
draconian nature of some early laws is the 1647 legislation of the General Court of
Massachusetts making it a capital offense for a Jesuit to be found in the territory of
Massachusetts Bay. THE SACRED RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE: SELECTED READINGS ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 98

(Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2009).
13 An Act Concerning Powdyke in Mersheland, 1530, 22 Hen. 8, c. 11 (Eng.).
14 See GEOFFREY DE CLINTON PARMITER, THE KING'S GREAT MATTER: A STUDY OF
ANGLO-PAPAL RELATIONS (1967) for background about the common use of this phrase
to describe King Henry's efforts to obtain a divorce from Queen Catherine in order to
marry Anne Boleyn.
15 As will be seen later in this Article, it was Henry VIII's plan to enforce the Act of
Succession with a further statute requiring an oath to be taken by all his subjects. If a
person refused, as was the case of Sir Thomas More and John Cardinal Fisher,
attainder would follow necessitating imprisonment and the confiscation of the
malfeasant's property.
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enact new statutes that would achieve his goals. The progression
of the several statutes surrounding "the King's great matter"
illustrates how deficiencies of the earlier statutes were addressed
with the passage of additional ones even though the King's
pleasure, rather than the common good, was the goal.
Robert Bolt's play and screenplay, both entitled A Man for All
Seasons,16 have brought popular understanding to "the King's
great matter" and the enactment of the statutes that were
promulgated to realize the King's implacable will to obtain a
divorce on the one hand and to legitimize a remarriage on the
other.1 7 The bearing that these legislative initiatives would have
on England and her people, including such prominent persons as
Sir Thomas More and John Cardinal Fisher, are well known by
most individuals versed in the rudimentary history of Tudor
England. As someone not accustomed to being refused his will and
way, Henry saw to it that each successive statute which he asked
Parliament to enact would get him closer to his goal of divorce and
remarriage, notwithstanding what the law of the Church-at one
time his Church-required.
This Article is not about the trials for high treason and the
evaluation of evidence used to convict Thomas More of the crime. 18
16 ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS (1960); A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS
(Columbia Pictures 1966).
17 BOLT, supra note 16.
18 During the Tudor era, trials for treason were largely compliance with
formalities. It was generally understood that there was a strong legal or political
reason for bringing a person to trial under the charge of high treason. As Bellamy,
explains, feudal allegiance was an essential element of success and survival, and any
challenge to the sovereign was viewed as a challenge to a people's way of life based on
the absolutism of the monarch. J. G. BELLAMY, THE LAW OF TREASON IN ENGLAND IN
THE LATER MIDDLE AGES (2004). Rarely, if ever, was the accused acquitted of the
charge. In the case of due process of law at the trial, defendants rarely saw the
indictment before the trial began; moreover, the right to counsel was nonexistent.
While there could be some questioning of witnesses and the presentation of legal
argument, these mattered little, especially when the sovereign was determined on
achieving a conviction. For a history of the law of treason prior to the reign of Henry
VIII, see BELLAMY, supra. Such was the trial of Thomas More. See Louis W. Karlin &
David R. Oakley, A Guide to Thomas More's Trial for Modern Lawyers, in THOMAS
MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY 71-93 (Henry Ansgar Kelly et al. eds., 2011). At this point it is
important to understand that elements of the legal proceedings against Fisher and
More were different. More maintained his silence and never said anything to anyone
prior to his conviction about the king's new title of Supreme Head of the Church in
England; however, Cardinal Fisher, upon the presumption of confidentiality, did

548

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 83:3

Rather, the goal of this essay is a simpler one: to understand the
promulgation of, and to interpret the meaning of, the legislative
texts King Henry had enacted that were designed to pressure into
submission those opposed to the King's plan of obtaining his
divorce from Queen Catherine, of making Anne Boleyn queen, of
providing for a new line of succession (hence, bastardizing
Princess Mary), and of making the king the Supreme Head of the
Church in England, thereby separating English Christians from
Rome and the pope. In these contexts, some of the evidence
surrounding the trial will be discussed, but, again, this Article is
about statutory making and construction and not the trial itself,
as I have already stated. In short, this Article is geared to
extracting the best meaning from legislative texts that were
enacted to further the goals of the sovereign. In this context, it can
be reasonably assumed that statutes mean something. Moreover,
they are typically intended to mean something that is intelligible
and necessary. In addition, the words they contain and the
syntactical order in which they are arranged are guides for
subjects, citizens, and anyone else who reads them. Most
importantly, statutes are enacted to impact the lives of those who
live under this law. This Article is a search for an understanding
of the statutes enacted and used against the English people whose
views on "the King's great matter" did not coincide with the
King's. In particular, these laws had a great impact on the life of
Sir Thomas More.
The making of legislation is a somewhat easy task; moreover,
its interpretation should also be a simple task by considering what
the lawmaker puts into the law and by reading the words chosen
by the legislator once the legislator's intent and purpose are made
inform Richard Rich that the king was not, and could not, be the head of the Church.
E. E. REYNOLDS, SAINT JOHN FISHER 261, 276 (1955). The case of Cardinal Fisher
differs from that of Sir Thomas More in some respects. The first is that for a while,
Bishop Fisher publicly preached sermons on the indissolubility of the marriage
between Henry and Catherine of Aragon. During her banishment from court, Bishop
Fisher also supplied spiritual comfort by his visitations with Queen Catherine.
Moreover, Fisher, unlike More, fell into a trap laid by the King's henchmen when
Richard Rich, under the pretext of seeking Fisher's private view of the king's
Parliamentary-conferred title, Supreme Head of the Church in England, by telling Rich
confidentially, at the King's request, that the king as a layman could not be the head of
the Church. See REYNOLDS, supra, at 259-61.This statement fraudulently extracted
from Fisher was later used at his trial. Id.
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clear. Of course, interpreting the meaning of these words and the
laws they construct is the real work of the lawyer and the person
whose life is affected by these words. So, how should the
interpretative task proceed?
Statutory interpretation is a synthetic process that examines
the words and their syntax along with the intention (i.e., the
thoughts of the drafters), the objectives for which the statute was
passed, and the contexts in which the statute was written and
applied. 19 The process of interpreting statutes should conclude
with the goal of ensuring that the interpretation coheres with the
other laws applicable to the issue and the people involved. If it
does not, then the rule of law becomes a hindrance, rather than an
asset, to the common lives of those persons who come within the
authority of the statutes. The application of statutes and their
interpretations can, and do, impact the lives of those who come
under the statutes' purview. If the citizens (or, in the case of
England, the subjects) complied with Henry's statutory mandates,
their lives would prosper-or at least continue-and the King's
plan to remarry and to separate the English church from Rome
would go on. If, however, they resisted in complying with his
codified demands, the subjects' lives would be forfeited, and the
King would still have his way.
The question can be refined to this: what did the statutes
enacted for "the King's great matter" objectively mean? In
particular, what was the meaning of the two statutes used to
convict Thomas More, and was the language and the syntactical
arrangement used sufficient for the task at hand? Another
question stands close by as it always does when the investigation
of legal texts is underway: were these statutes intended to serve
the common good or were they intended to do something else?

19 Araujo, supra note 1. My approach to statutory interpretation is a complement
to, rather than a competitor of, plain meaning interpretation. Plain meaning
interpretation has been defined as reliance on the ordinary meaning of the language of
the legislative text. See, e.g., Sussex Peerage Case, (1844) 8 Eng. Rep. 1034; Caminetti
v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). Courts relying on plain meaning interpretation
do suggest that there are means for ignoring the ordinary meaning of the language
such as when this would lead to an absurd result or impractical consequence.
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It became clear that the Defender of the Faith 20 was on his
way to joining the ranks of the tyrannical in large part because he
abused the legal process to pass legislation addressing "the King's
great matter" and to facilitate results conducive to his
expectations. 21 The objective interpretation of the relevant
statutes enacted by Henry's Parliament is crucial to the task of
assessing whether a man like Thomas More was a traitor who had
committed acts of high treason. Just as importantly, it is crucial to
keep in mind: why was the law of high treason amended by King
Henry, as England already had legislation dealing with this
matter that was enacted in 1351? In other words, was there a
need for this new legislation to address threats to the common
good of the English realm? So the task here is to determine, by
careful construction, the meaning of these statutes used to convict

20 POPE LEO X, PAPAL BULL (Oct. 15, 1521), reprinted in DEFENCE OF THE SEVEN
SACRAMENTS 171 (Louis O'Donovan ed., 1908). As Pope Leo X declared,

Considering that it is but Just, that those, who undertake pious Labours, in
Defence of the Faith of Christ, should be extolled with all Praise and Honour;
and being willing, not only to magnify with deserved Praise, and approve
with our Authority, what your Majesty has with Learning and Eloquence writ
against Luther; but also to Honour your Majesty with such a Title, as shall
give all Christians to understand, as well in our Times, as in succeeding
Ages, how acceptable and welcome Your Gift was to Us, especially in this
Juncture of Time: We, the true Successor of St. Peter (whom Christ, before
his Ascension, left as his Vicar upon Earth, and to whom he committed the
Care of his Flock) presiding in this Holy See, from whence all Dignity and
Titles have their Source; have with our Brethren maturely deliberated on
these Things; and with one Consent unanimously decreed to bestow on your
Majesty this Title, viz: Defender of the Faith . . .. we likewise command all
Christians, that they name your Majesty by this Title; and that in their
Writings to your Majesty, immediately after the Word KING, they add,
DEFENDER OF THE FAITH.
Id. (alteration to original). The letter of the pope to Henry went on reminding him not
to be proud but humble and to remain "strong and constant in your Devotion to this
Holy See, by which you were exalted." Id.
21 Under the Act of High Treason, one of the statutes in More's indictment and
investigated in this Article, it was an actionable offense to call the king a "tyrant."
1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (Eng.). It is relevant to note here that earlier in his career as
Speaker of the House of Commons, Thomas More fought for and achieved the right of
Members of Parliament to speak their mind and to be immune, therefore, from the
wrath of the Crown. William Roper, A Life of Sir Thomas More, in A MAN OF SINGULAR
VIRTUE: BEING A LIFE OF SIR THOMAS MORE BY HIS SON-IN-LAW WILLIAM ROPER AND A
SELECTION OF MORE'S LETTERS 27, 39 (A. L. Rowse ed., 1980). The petition was made
by More on April 18, 1523. Id.
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people like More of high treason-a crime which, if proven, would
necessitate the penalty of death. 22 While the King's plan was a
22 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (Eng.). Under the law of England, treason-or high
treason (i.e., treason against the sovereign)-was a most serious offense. Blackstone in
his Commentaries on the Laws of England devotes a chapter to it in Volume IV, which
deals with Public Wrongs. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *74. As Blackstone
noted, it "is the highest civil crime, which (considered as a member of the community)
any man can possibly commit." Id. at *75. He also contended that words, by
themselves, ought not to be considered treason although they may constitute a high
misdemeanor. Id. at *80. He says nothing of silence, and this would be logical following
that if words are insufficient to sustain the crime, how could silence be any more
offensive? Interestingly, Blackstone discusses Edward's 1351 statute on treason, and
he makes veiled reference to those enacted by Henry VIII, whose reign he calls
"bloody," and states that these laws were infected by "the spirit of inventing new and
strange treasons" including "refus[al] to abjure [renounce] the pope." Id. at *86. In this
regard, Blackstone mentions the first statute enacted under the reign of Queen Mary
was the repealing of "certain treasons, felonies, and praemunire." Id. at *87; An Act
Repealing Certain Treasons Felonies and Praemunire, 1553, 1 Mary, c. 1 (Eng.). This
very first statute enacted under the reign of Mary abrogated the laws enacted by her
father, King Henry VIII, and reinstated those acts deemed to be treason under
Edward's 1351 Act of Treason, as Blackstone acknowledges. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra, at
*87. However, as Blackstone noted, Parliament later began to expand the nature of the
crime of high treason once again. Id. However, this renewed expansion would not be
pertinent to the specifics of this Article. Yet, they do have a bearing on the general
subject matter for, as Blackstone noted, Queen Elizabeth I again pursued steps making
the acts of "papists" crimes constituting high treason. See 1562, 5 Eliz., c. 1 (Eng.);
1584, 27 Eliz., c 2 (Eng.). James I would follow suit. See 1603, 1 Jac., c. 4 (Eng.). This
anti-Catholic theme in the subsequent statutes dealing with high treason would
continue. See 1701, 13 & 14 Will. 3, c. 3 (Eng.). It addresses the Catholic line of Stuarts
and their claims to the English throne which would interfere with the "security of the
protestant succession," as Blackstone called it. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *90-91. The
crime of high treason is generally understood as a betrayal of the relationship and duty
that a person has with the sovereign. The relationship and duty demand allegiance.
Initially under the common law, high treason was a matter left to the judges of the
courts to decide; however, in order to eliminate what might be viewed as arbitrary or
discretionary, statutes were eventually passed. Edward III (1312-1377) was the king
when Parliament passed the praemunire statutes that were a legislative effort to
restrict papal influence in England. 1363, 38 Edw. 3, c. 12 (Eng.). Most pertinent to
this Article is the Treason Act of 1351, which was the first codification of the crime in
order to clarify the expansion given to it over time by the common law judges. 1351, 25
Edw. 3, c. 2 (Eng.). The original statute provided two divisions: high treason which was
against the sovereign, and petit treason which was against another subject, typically
one's superior. Id. The essence of the 1351 codification was to specify what acts-what
offenses-constituted high treason, i.e., treason against the sovereign. These acts
include: If one were to "compass" [i.e., to contrive, devise, or machinate some bad
purpose or evil design] or "imagine" [i.e., to conceive in the mind; to devise, plot, or plan
against] the death of the king, the queen, or the heir; if a man violated the king's eldest
unmarried daughter or the wife of the king's eldest son and heir; or if one were to wage
war against the king in his Realm or give aid and comfort to the king's enemies in his
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clever one designed to achieve results satisfactory to the interests
of the Crown, each successive element of the legislative series had
the additional purpose of closing all escapes that might otherwise
frustrate the King's will. 2 3 In this regard, there is one word in
particular in the legislation enacted by Parliament at the King's
insistence that will require particular consideration: "maliciously."
For many interpreters, it was not a crime to do certain things that
might adversely affect the king's interests; rather, it was a crime,
i.e., high treason, to do certain things if done maliciously.24 I Will
discuss this in greater detail in the third part of this Article.
This Article will be presented in five parts, the first of which
is this introduction, which will be followed by several substantive
matters. The second section will provide an overview of the
legislation dealing with "the King's great matter." The third part
will investigate, so as to refine the objective import of the
language, the meaning of key words used to prosecute persons of
the crimes detailed by Parliament to address "the King's great
matters." 25 The fourth component will consider whether the
Realm; if one counterfeited the Great or Privy Seal or money; or, if one killed the
Chancellor, Treasurer, or certain specified judges. Id. For a fascinating article on King
Henry VIII's contribution to the law of high treason and his expansion of the offenses it
contained see I. D. Thornley, The Treason Legislation of Henry VIII (1531-1534), 11

TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. Soc'Y 87, 87-123 (1917).
23 While it may seem that Henry was the sole force behind the legislation as the
Crown typically was the dominant catalyst for new legislation, it is clear that
Parliament often acted on its own by either blunting, eliminating, or modifying
elements of the texts that the King and Thomas Cromwell, urged on them. Thornley,
supra note 22, at 119-21. Ultimately Thornley posited the view that the Henrician
legislation that is the subject of this Article "expressed the wishes of Parliament; it
bore the hallmarks of parliamentary approval, and the Parliament which freely chose
to pass it must bear the responsibility for its deeds." Id. at 123.
24 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (Eng.).
25 As I mention elsewhere in this Article, the word "maliciously," which appears in
Henry's Act of High Treason, and in other statutes, plays a prominent role in the
construction of the legislation. Generally, in Anglo-American law, i.e., law that has
developed in the common law system, the word malice and its derivatives (adjective
and adverb) have largely meant dealing with an intentional doing of a wrongful act
without just cause or reasonable excuse. The term "maliciously" played a key role in
the prosecution of those like More and Fisher who were not compliant with the king's
demands. The base word, and those which derive from it, can be used in criminal and
civil contexts. In the cases of Sir Thomas More and John Cardinal Fisher the statute,
the Act of High Treason, was a criminal law; thus, the meanings considered in this
Article are those which concentrate on a criminal statute. Malice can be express or
construed. In the latter context, there must be some evidence demonstrating how it is
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conviction of Sir Thomas More was supported by the objective
meaning of the applicable statute's language in the context of the
evidence adduced. 26
In the end it will be clear that More did nothing or said
nothing "maliciously" that would warrant his conviction as a
traitor guilty of high treason. 27 The fifth and final section is a
conclusion that will also offer some thoughts that should provide
help to those involved with the drafting and interpretation of
statutes in the present age of the early twenty-first century. This
conclusion will also serve as a reminder about the role that
legislation ought to have in the rule of law regardless of whether
the legislation is from 1534 or 2013. I shall now turn to a
consideration of the relevant statutes that have a bearing on the
allegation of high treason brought against Sir Thomas More. 28

implied and being inferred from acts or words expressed in some fashion. In regard to
it being used to modify a verb, and this is the case in the Act of High Treason, it
imports a wish to vex, annoy, or injure in some substantive fashion another person.
The construction of these definitions is based on the discussion of the terms appearing
in Black's Law Dictionary and The Oxford English Dictionary, which offer temporal
definitions, i.e. the meaning of words as they were used in the reign of Henry VIII.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (Rev. 4th ed. 1968); THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(1989). For example, Thomas More would sometimes refer to "secret" matters, but he
did not intend the meaning we have today; rather, the meaning he conveyed was
synonymous with our present day understanding of "private matters." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY, supra,at 1358, 1519; THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra, at 836-38.
26 Two excellent works address the trial of Sir Thomas More. The first is the
classical work by E. E. Reynolds. See generally E. E. REYNOLDS, THE TRIAL OF ST.
THOMAS MORE (1964). The second, and more recent, is Thomas More's Trial by Jury.
See generally THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18; see also Roper, supra note
21.
27 As More said to the Council convened to interrogate him in 1535, "where there is
no malice, there can be no offense." A THOMAS MORE SOURCE BOOK 58 (Gerard B.
Wegemer & Stephen W. Smith eds., 2004).
28 Readers will note that in a number of instances, I have supplied additional
definitions to particular words of the statute. Although these words may have some
familiarity to the reader of the twenty-first century, they had different meanings to the
user of Tudor English. So, to avoid confusion or lack of recognition, I have supplied in
footnotes the meaning of these terms, as they would have been understood by the
contemporaries of King Henry and Sir Thomas More and company. Nonetheless, I also
provide explications where necessary to assist the English speaker of the twenty-first
century. In addition, I have substituted contemporary English spellings and
punctuation for Tudor ones where this has been necessary to facilitate an easier
reading.
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I. STATUTES ENACTED BY PARLIAMENT (1534-35) CONCERNING
THE KING'S GREAT MIVATTER

A. An Act for the Establishment of the King's Succession
With the King's scheme in place to divorce and discard Queen
Catherine in order to marry Anne Boleyn, 29 Henry VIII solicited
the support of the Parliament to ensure the plan's
implementation. 3 0 In March of 1534, the Parliament enacted the
initial legislation to further his objective, An Act for the
Establishment of the King's Succession.31 The legislation brought
to the center the status of the marriage between King Henry and
Queen Catherine, thereby paving the way to declare the marriage
with Catherine invalid and to make the Princess Mary an
illegitimate offspring. Moreover, the new law acknowledged the
legality of the private and low key 1533 marriage between Henry
and Anne Boleyn, and further recognized that the Crown would
succeed first to the sons who were the issue of Henry and Anne
and then to daughters, if no sons were born who survived the
King's death. 32
As is the case with many legislative matters of the present
age, the Act of Succession began with a statement of purpose that
recalled the recent English history of dynastic wars and proposed
a solution to avoid these wars in the future, or as the text itself
stated: "calling to our remembrances the great divisions" of the
times initiated by the unlawfulness of the marriage between the
King and the wife of his late brother, the act provided for a lawful
J. J. SCARISBRICK, HENRY VIII 11-12 (1968).
Id. at 305-54.
31 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.) ("Act of Succession").
32 Of course, Henry kept Parliament busy in its work regarding the line of
succession. With the conviction and execution of Anne Boleyn, Parliament passed the
Act of Succession of 1536, removing both Elizabeth and Mary from the line of
succession. 1536, 28 Hen. 8, c. 7 (Eng.). With the birth of Prince Edward in 1537, a
third act of succession was passed by Parliament in 1543, in which, amongst other
goals, Prince Edward would succeed King Henry; moreover, a provision was made for
the restoration of Princess Mary and Princess Elizabeth in the line of succession, in
that order. 1543, 35 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.). While other machinations were planned during
the reign of the boy King Edward, the third act of succession's terms ultimately
prevailed. Id. So, with Edward's death in 1553, Mary ascended the throne and reigned
until her death in 1558; upon Mary's death, Elizabeth became queen and reigned until
1603. Id.
29
30
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succession "without any contradiction" thereby legitimating the
heirs of Henry and Anne Boleyn. 33 This declaration presented the
point of view that there were problems in the House of Tudor that
would be unsettling to the future of England if they were not
addressed quickly so that dynastic wars could be avoided.
However, this statute presented a further concern unrelated to the
English crown's succession that was, at most, remotely related to
the succession issue: it was the assertion that the Pope (the
Bishop of Rome) had interfered with matters temporal and
ecclesial in England "contrary to the great and inviolable grants of
jurisdiction given by God immediately to emperors, kings, and
princes." 34 It was the duty of Parliament to respond to these
matters, which the King deemed in urgent need of legislative
resolution. As tension grew between the King and the Pope, it was
the view of the King that the Vicar of Christ had no jurisdiction in
matters ecclesial or temporal on the British Isles, particularly
with regard to the king's marital situation, as was evidenced by
the tenor of several of the statutes investigated in this Article.35
Thus, singling out Rome's ecclesiastical authority regarding the
king's marital state became a further project for Parliamentary
action.
The statute further acknowledged that if there had been a
marriage of sorts between the King and "Lady Catherine," it was
invalidated by certain facts or allegations, viz. that Catherine had
been Arthur's (Henry's older brother) wife before the marriage
with Henry, and that Arthur and Catherine had consummated
their marriage thereby intensifying the gravity of the relationship
33 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.) (alteration to original). I have used contemporary
English spellings, which replace those of the Tudor English.
34 Id. (alteration to original). Not wishing to let the Pope off too easily, this
legislation reinforced the concerns about threats from the Pope by pointing out how
Rome's attempt to influence authority over the English king could act as an incentive
and encourage other temporal authorities to attempt to do the same. Id.
3 King Henry was an adept user of sacred scripture when it was to his advantage
to rely on Biblical quotations as was evident when he began to advocate that Queen
Catherine could not be his wife as she had first been his brother Arthur's wife. See
SCARISBRICK, supra note 29, at 163-65. However, when it came to removing the pope as
the head of the Church and replacing himself, Henry conveniently forgot the Biblical
passage, "And I say also unto thee, [t]hat thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build
my church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." Matthew 16:18 (King
James); see also infra note 37.
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between Catherine and Henry. 36 Henry had argued that the law of
God prohibited him from marrying his brother's widow
notwithstanding the different Biblical passages that presented
different perspectives on the matter. 37 This initial legislation
relied upon the assertions of the new Archbishop of Canterbury,
Thomas Cramner (a compliant human instrument in the hands of
the King), asserting that the marriage between Henry and
Catherine was "against the laws of Almighty God" and should be
"taken of no value or effect." 38 These declarations of Cranmer, as
codified in the Act of Succession, were deemed by the King to
supersede and thus neutralize the dispensation given by the Pope
that had previously permitted Henry to marry his brother's
widow, i.e., Catherine. 39 Through the enactment of this statute,
England also sent Rome and the pope a message presenting
Henry's view that Rome's authority did not reach into the king's
realm of England on any matter dealing with temporal or spiritual
issues. This would be subsequently confirmed by the Act of
Supremacy, 40 which acknowledged that Henry was the Supreme
Head on earth of the Church in England. 4 1 As the Act of
Succession suggested, what had been dispensed by Rome could not
be considered a dispensation in England, since the Bishop of Rome
had no valid authority to usurp the authority of God-as

36 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.). The fact of the consummation of the marriage
between Arthur and Catherine is highly contested. See, e.g., G. W. BERNARD, THE
KING'S REFORMATION: HENRY VIII AND THE REMAKING OF THE ENGLISH CHURCH 20-25
(2005).
37 See Leviticus 20:21 (King James) ("[I]f a man shall take his brother's wife, it [is]
an unclean thing: he hath uncovered his brother's nakedness; they shall be childless.").
King Henry thought that this was why Catherine produced no viable sons, although
Princess Mary was born of this marriage and would eventually rule England from
1553-58. But see Deuteronomy 25:5 (King James) ("If brethren dwell together, and one
of them die, and have no child, the wife of the dead shall not marry, without unto a
stranger: her husband's brother shall go in unto her, and take her to him to wife, and
perform the duty of an husband's brother unto her."). Thomas More thought the
Deuteronomy passage more applicable to King Henry's circumstances than the
Leviticus text. JOHN EDWARDS, MARY 1: ENGLAND'S CATHOLIC QUEEN 24-25 (2011).
38 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.).
3 There were doubts by even ecclesiastical officials that the six-year-old
dispensation was no longer operative given the long passage of time. See SCARISBRICK,
supra note 29, at 13.
4o See infra Part I.C.
41 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.).
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interpreted by Thomas Cranmer-over England. 42 Interestingly,
there was no mention in the statute citing the authority by which
the king or Parliament could transfer the pope's authority to the
king. 43 However, the legislation was fortified by a provision
stating, the illegality of the marriage between Henry and
Catherine was confirmed by the most highly regarded and
competent academics of the English universities, as well as some
of their continental European counterparts. 44 Of course the fact
that these academics relied upon the King's good grace to continue
their work and physical existence was not mentioned. The act did
state, however, that the opinions of these members of the academy
were those of "many right excellent well-earned men." 4 5 So in the
company of, and with the concurrence of, such learned persons,
the King could not be wrong-or so it was thought.
There remained one other matter requiring legislation and
this involved the matter of what was to be done with Queen, now
Lady, Catherine who had been considered Henry's wife for over
twenty years. Parliament did not waste any time in addressing
this issue by conferring a new title on her: "that said Lady
42 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.). In an effort to add further authority
to these
provisions, Parliament took steps to make "the King's great matter" seem like one that
affected other segments of the general population. Consequently, the act stated:

[I]n case there be any person or persons . . . within this Realm or in any [of]
the King's Dominions already married within any the said degrees above
specified, and not yet separate from the bounds of such unlawful marriage,
that then every such person so unlawfully married shall be separate by the
definitive sentence and judgment of the Archbishops, Bishops, and other
Ministers of the Church of England, and in other your Dominions within the
limits of their jurisdictions and authorities, and by none other power or
authority. And that all sentences and judgment given and to be given by any
Archbishop, Bishop, or other minister of the church of England, or in other
the king's Dominions within the limits of their jurisdictions and authority,
shall be definitive, firm, good, and effectual to all intents, and be observed
and obeyed without suing any provocations, appeals, prohibitions, or other
process from the Court of Rome to the derogation thereof, or contrary to the
act made since the beginning of this present parliament for restraint of such
provocations, appeals, prohibitions, and other processes.
1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.) (alteration to original).
4
See id.
44 Id. While reformed or reformist-oriented scholars on the European continent had
little to fear from Henry, the English scholars did not have much of a choice in the
matter since the King was their sovereign and they were his subjects.
4

Id.
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Catherine shall be from henceforth called and reputed only
Dowager to Prince Arthur and not Queen of this Realm." 4 6 What
God, the Church, the Pope, and many others had declared a
marriage was no longer so by the stroke of the Parliamentary pen,
thereby making the union of Henry and Anne "the lawful
matrimony" according to the judgment of Henry and his allies in
Parliament and the universities. 47
The Act of Succession addressed several other related issues
by specifying that the male offspring of Henry and Anne would be
the lawful heirs and in the immediate succession to the Crown by
order of age from the oldest male heir to the youngest male heir;
however, if there were no male issue alive at the time of the King's
death, but there were female issue, then the females beginning
with the oldest to the youngest would be in the line of
succession. 48 Specific reference was made in this legislation to
"Lady Elizabeth now princess" who would have lawful claim to the
Crown should there be no male heir alive at the time of the King's
death. 49 Perhaps no one thought at the time that this is what
eventually would happen, but the King's evolving prudence would
revisit the matter in later years.50 No mention was made,
however, of the Princess Mary, the older daughter of the King. As
a practical matter, she was bastardized by the legislative
acknowledgment that there never was a marriage between Henry
and Catherine.
This statute, like the others that would follow, not only
declared what the law was according to the lawmaker, it also
46 Id. Shortly after this, Parliament enacted another statute, which made certain
provisions for the Queen-although she was not to be referred to as "Queen" but as
"Princess Dowager to Prince Arthur." An Act for the Lady Dowager, 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c.
28 (Eng.).
7 An Act for the Lady Dowager, 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 28 (Eng.).
48 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.).

4

Id.

s0 In subsequent years, Henry would have Parliament enact further legislation
removing Princess Elizabeth from the line of succession. 1536, 28 Hen. 8, c. 7 (Eng.).
However, both Mary and Elizabeth were restored to the line of succession, in this
order, after the Prince of Wales who would later become King Edward VI, but he died
at the age of fifteen. See Act of Succession to the Crown, 1543, 35 Hen. 8, c.1 (Eng.).
Under the growing influence of Protestantism in England, Edward attempted to
prevent this act from taking effect in his will, especially with regard to the Catholic
Mary; however, the 1544 legislation ultimately prevailed. EDWARDS, supra note 37, at
76-77, 103, 106.
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specified the means by which the law was to be administered and
enforced. In this regard, a variety of enforcement mechanisms
would be called upon to implement and enforce legislation, such as
conducting investigations and holding hearings, which could be
followed by some kind of penalty for the failure to observe the
requirements of the statute. 51 In the case of any failure to abide by
the Act of Succession of 1534, Parliament chose the enforcement
mechanism of criminal penalties and specified two: high treason
and misprision of treason. 52 Regarding the first, matter of high
treason against the sovereign, a person could be convicted of a
crime,
by writing or imprinting or by any exterior act or deed,
maliciously procure or do or cause to be procured or done
anything or things to the peril of your most royal person, or
maliciously gave occasion by writing, print, deed, or act
whereby your Highness might be disturbed or interrupted of
the Crown of this Realm, or by writing, print, deed, or act
procure or do or cause to be procured or done anything or
things to the prejudice, slander, disturbance, or derogation of
the said lawful matrimony solemnized between your Majesty
& the said Queen Anne, or to the pyll, slander, or derision of
any the issues and heirs of your Highness being limited by
this act to inherit and to be inheritable to the Crown of this
Realm in such form as is aforesaid, whereby any such issues
or heirs of your Highness might be destroyed, disturbed, or
interrupted in body or title of inheritance to the Crown of this
Realm as to them is limited in this act in form above
rehearsed, that then every such person and persons of what
estate, degree, or condition they be of, subject or resident
within this Realm, and their aider, counselors, maintainers,

1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.); see also 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 2 (Eng.).
1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.). High treason is a crime against the sovereign. THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 459. It is distinguished from petit
treason, which is against one's master but not the sovereign. Id. Misprision of treason
is essentially the failure to perform a lawful duty; in this case, the duty was to take the
oath required by the Act of Succession. Id. at 459, 879; 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.). A
person convicted of misprision of treason would forfeit all his or her property to the
Crown and would be imprisoned; however, the death penalty could not be administered
to a person convicted only of misprision of treason. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at
*120-21. Capital punishment consisting of hanging, drawing, quartering, and
beheading was reserved for those persons convicted of high treason. Id. at *92.
51
52

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

560

[VOL. 83:3

and abettors and every of them, for every such offence shall be
adjudged high traitors, and every such offence shall be
adjudged high treason, and the offender and their aiders,
counselors, maintainers, and abettors and every of them,
being lawfully convicted of such offence by presentment,
verdict, confession, or process according to the customs and
laws of this Realm, shall suffer pains of death as in cases of
high treason. 53
The statute focused on acts and publications that would give
offense to the King, Anne Boleyn, or their children (heirs) in two
contexts: the legitimacy of the marriage and the succession to the
Crown. 54 However, it is not just any deed or word that achieves
these ends, but rather deeds or words that are produced
maliciously. The meaning of this word is crucial to any effort to
understand the scope of the legislation passed by the Parliament.
An examination of this word's meaning will subsequently follow in
the next part of this Article as the word "maliciously" appears
prominently in the legislation relied upon to prosecute Thomas
More. However, I note here this word's prominence in the Act of
Succession.
Even though More said or did nothing maliciously against the
line of succession that would emerge from the issue of Henry and
Anne, it was the next requirement dealing with the oath which
had a bearing on his case, insofar as another statute requiring the
taking of an oath to implement the next segment's elements.
However, it was evident that if the Act of Succession only required
an oath by the subjects, simply affirming their acceptance of the
line of succession for which the statute provided, Thomas More
would have likely gone along.5 5 But the fact that the legislation
covered other matters beyond the line of succession, particularly
1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.) (alteration to original) (emphasis added).
Id.
55 PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE 361 (1998). As Reynolds noted in
his biography, More realized that he had to study carefully together the Act of
Succession and the Act Requiring the Oath for the Act of Succession, because the Act of
Succession, by itself, did not contain the words by which each subject was to swear. E.
E. REYNOLDS, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF ST THOMAS MORE: THE FIELD IS WON 300-01
(1968). For More, the two sticking points in the oath dealt with (1) the repudiation of
papal authority, and (2) the validity of the marriage with Anne Boleyn and the
invalidity of the marriage to Queen Catherine. Id.; see also REYNOLDS, supra note 26,
at 112.
53
54
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the illegality of the marriage with Queen Catherine and the
legality of the new marriage with "Queen Anne," prevented More
from taking the oath mandated by the Act of Succession.5 6 In
retrospect, blood could have been saved rather than spilt if the
statute only addressed the line of succession and nothing else.
This simple and clear objective would have served the King and
his realm well; moreover, a prominent person such as Thomas
More, who might have had other objections to the King's plans,
would likely have gone along by publicly taking the oath if it had
only dealt with the line of succession. In the context of the
purposes for which legislation was enacted, Henry may well have
spared his country and the Church many difficulties if this
legislation had been restricted to determining who would succeed
him. Unfortunately, this prudent course of action was not
pursued. As a result, lives were lost, and England broke from
Rome.
The misprision of treason element of the Act of Succession
was another crucial element of this legislation, and it provided
that:
[I]f any person or persons ... by any word without writing or
any exterior deed or act maliciously and obstinately publish,
divulge, or utter anything or things to the peril of your
Highness, or to the slander or prejudice of the said matrimony
solemnized between your Highness and the said Queen Anne,

or to the slander or derision of the issue and heirs of your
body begotten and to be gotten of the said Queen Anne, or any
other your lawful heirs which shall be inheritable to the
Crown of this Realm as is afore limited by this act, that then
every such offence shall be taken and adjudged for misprision

of treason; And that every person and persons of what estate,
degree, or condition so ever they be, subject or resident within
this Realm or in any the King's Dominions so doing and
offending, and being hereof lawfully convicted by
presentment, verdict, process, or confession, shall suffer
imprisonment of their bodies at the King's will, and shall lose
as well all their goods, chattels, and debts as all such interests
and estates of freehold or for years which any such offenders

shall have of or in any Land, Rent, or Hereditament
56

REYNOLDS, supra note 55.

MISSISSIPPI LAW JOURNAL

562

[VOL. 83:3

whatsoever at the time of conviction and attainder of such
offence.5 7
Once again, the word "maliciously" played a key role in this
statute.5 8
The statute contained other provisions such as
eliminating the right of sanctuary, which would have otherwise
been available to those who may be charged with crimes, 59 but the
elements presented here are the ones crucial to this essay's
objectives. Again, by itself, this unambiguous language had no
bearing on More. However, when combined with the statute
requiring an oath to the substantive provisions of the Act of
Succession, dealing with not only the identification of the legal
heirs to the Crown but also the legitimacy of the marriage with
Anne Boleyn, Thomas More would find himself in peril.
The King and his counselors recognized that other statutes
were necessary to implement the King's will and were
subsequently enacted so as to restrict the escapes that the
talented mind of More was able to identify. The ensuing
legislation was viewed as essential to tighten the noose around the
necks of those who were able to slip through the thicket of the first
statute. With the passage of time, three more statutes were
passed in order to facilitate the plans surrounding "the King's
great matter." It was the next statute which offered a potent
mechanism for implementing the Act of Succession, and it was the
Act Ratifying the Oath that Every of the King's Subjects Has
Taken and Shall Hereafter Be Bound to Take for Due Observation

1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.) (alteration to original) (emphasis added).
Id. But as Thornley points out in referring to a statement attributable to a
Thomas Bayly discussing the case of John Cardinal Fisher, "The adverb [maliciously]
was forced into the Bill, and was as nugatory in its effects as an adverb in a Bill can
be." Thornley, supranote 22, at 122.
59 See 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.). As Thornley mentions in her informative essay,
sanctuary became a target of the anti-clerical sentiments of the time and the antiRoman views of Henry. Thornley, supra note 22, at 112-15. However, in spite of the
growing dislike of the clergy by some Englishmen and of Rome by the King, Thornley
indicates that there appeared to have been temporal limits on how long sanctuary
could be respected; in other words, the idea was that the few days of sanctuary in a
church or monastery would give the offender sufficient time to reconcile with God and
with any person who may have been offended. Id. However, Henry and his Parliament
were anxious to deprive any person accused of high treason even these several days of
sanctuary. Id.
57
58
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of the Act Made for the Surety of the Succession of the King's
60
Highness in the Crown of the Realm.
B. The Act Requiring the Taking of the Oath Concerningthe Act

of Succession
This legislation mandated that subjects would swear an oath
"without fraud or guile" pledging, in the affirmative, their
agreement with the Act of Succession of 1534 that was just
discussed. 61 As the statute requiring the oath is substantively
directed to the acknowledgement of succession of the Crown, the
oath required public acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the
succession of the Crown to the issue of Henry and Anne Boleyn. 62
The oath to be made by the declarant was to follow this
formulation:
Y[e] shall swear to bear faith, truth, and obedience alone to
the King's Majesty and to his heirs of his body of his most
dear and entirely beloved lawful wife Queen Anne begotten &
to be begotten, [a]nd further to the heirs of our said Sovereign
Lord according to the limitation in the Statute made for
surety of his succession in the crown of this Realm mentioned
and contained, and not to any other within this Realm nor
foreign authority or Potentate;And in case any oath be made
or hath be made by you to any person or persons, that then ye
to repute the same as vain and annihilate; And that to your
cunning, wit, and utter most of your power without guile,
fraud, or other undue mean you shall observe, keep, maintain,
& defend the said act of succession, and all the whole effects
& contents thereof, and all other acts and statutes made in
confirmation or for execution of the same or of anything
therein contained; and this ye shall do against all manner of
persons of what estate, dignity, degree, or condition so ever
they be, And in no ways do or attempt, nor to your power
suffer to be done or attempted, directly or indirectly anything

60 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 2 (Eng.) ("Act Requiring the Taking of the Oath Concerning
the Act of Succession").
61 Id.
62

Id.
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or things privily 63 or apartly64 to the let,6 5 hindrance, damage,
or derogation thereof or of any part of the same by any
manner of means or for any manner of pretense; So help you
God, all Saints, and the Holy Evangelists.66
As already noted, More was willing to concede the line of
succession established by Parliament. Indeed, there was nothing
to indicate that they would have objected to legislation specifying
who would succeed King Henry VIII-if that were all the
legislation contained, and if that were all the oath required, but it
did contain more which would be the impediment to Thomas
More's compliance. However, a grave problem lurked in the actual
oath's acknowledgement about two other matters, and these were:
(1) the validity of the marriage with Anne Boleyn, and (2) the
denying of any foreign authority and potentates-which would
have been a public denial by More of the lawful authority of the
pope.67 Undoubtedly, this oath would serve as a mechanism to
eradicate any lingering loyalty to Rome and the pope through a
repudiation of any allegiance to Rome with the words "and not to
any other within this Realm nor foreign authority or Potentate."68
The oath mandated affirmative action on the part of the declarant
to not only observe and keep the oath but also to maintain and
defend the Act of Succession and observe the succession that was
mandated.69 The oath would also serve as a means of giving one's
blessing to the marriage between Henry and Anne Boleyn. The
references to fraud, guile, and "undue means" indicated that the
oath was to be made in such a way that each declarant had to
assert most sincerely without any reservation, qualification, or
duplicity his or her agreement with the rest of the legislation's
63 Not openly or publicly; secretly; in secret; stealthily; craftily; discreetly; by
oneself. Also incognito; obscurely. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at
523.
6
Being removed from the general body; separately; independently; individually.
Id. at 542.
65 According to The Oxford English Dictionary, "Hindrance, stoppage, obstruction;
also, something that hinders, an impediment. Now arch.: most common in phrase let or
hindrance. (Cf. Middle English lite)" Id. at 844.
66 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 2 (Eng.) (alteration to original) (emphasis added to highlight
the elements of concern to Thomas More).

68

Id.
Id.

69

1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.).

67
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provisions. 70 Finally, the oath statute contained a mechanism for
prosecuting cases of refusal.7 1 If any person, regardless of his or
her status as public official or private subject, failed to take the
oath, or displayed any hesitation in doing so, the commissioners
who would administer the oath had the duty to certify the refusal
that would serve as the triggering mechanism to bring legal
proceedings against any person who failed to comply with the oath
law. 72 This certification could then be used as a means for
attainder of those who refused to take the oath in the prescribed
manner. 73 Failure to take the oath in the manner prescribed
would constitute the failure to comply with a legal duty, which
constitutes the crime of misprision of treason. 74 To a devout
person like More, the invocation of the names of God, the saints,
and the Evangelists of the Gospel would have intensified the
seriousness of the oath and the complications it presented
concerning the marriage with Boleyn and the separation from
Rome.
Because of his refusal to take the oath required by this
statute, Sir Thomas More became a target of attainder legislation
in which arrest and imprisonment were mandated for his
misprision of treason; furthermore, in accordance with the
provisions of attainder, his property was forfeited and confiscated
by the Crown for failure to take the required oath. Parliament
consequently enacted two attainder statutes, one directed at John
Cardinal Fisher and other bishops7 5 and the other at Sir Thomas
More. 76 These attainder laws levied against More and Fisher were
based on, and mentioned, the two previous statutes-i.e., the Act
of Succession and the Act Requiring the Taking of the Oath
Concerning the Act of Succession-so indirectly the oath statute
and the Act of Succession had a distinct role in the imprisonment

70

1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 2 (Eng.).

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

See BLACKSTONE, supra note 22; see also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
An Act Concerning the Attainder of the Bishop of Rochester and Others, 1534,
26 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.).
76 An Act Concerning the Attainder of Sir Thomas More Knight, 1534, 26 Hen. 8,
c. 23 (Eng.).
7
7
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of More and Fisher and the confiscation of their property.77 The
wording of this legislation indicated that More and Fisher were
attainted, judged, and convicted of misprision of high treason
(which was referred to in the Act of Succession) because they
would not swear to the oath required for the Act of Succession.
While capital punishment could not be meted out for
misprision of high treason, arrest and incarceration and the
confiscation of property could be, and were, meted out. In the case
of the statute pertaining to Fisher, he also forfeited the diocese of
Rochester "as though [he] were then naturally dead."78 He would
be in due course. While these statutes are important to the
complete history of Tudor England and the crusade pursued on
behalf of "the King's great matter," I will not focus on them any
further in this Article, as they were not directly involved in the
trial of More for the charge of high treason.
In spite of the attainder of More and Fisher for misprision of
treason, the King remained unsatisfied. Holdouts like More and
Fisher who refused to take the oath that complemented the Act of
Succession were viewed as making a statement to England and
the world that unsettled the King and his increasingly despotic
regime. Hence, additional legislation was prepared to force More
to make the kind of declaration that would satisfy the King, or so
Henry thought. If More persisted in his refusal, the former Lord
Chancellor would face the death penalty for high treason. Thus,
77 In both cases, the attainder legislation against More and Fisher were based on
the Act of Succession, 1534, 25 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.), and the Act Requiring the Taking of
the Oath Concerning the Act of Succession, 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 2 (Eng.). The legislation
against More, An Act Concerning the Attainder of Sir Thomas More Knight, 1534, 26
Hen. 8, c. 23 (Eng.), stated that the attainder was appropriate because,
contrary to the trust and confidence aforesaid being lawfully and duly
required ... unnaturally and contrary to his duty of allegiance, intending to
sow and make sedition, murmur, and grudge within this the King's Realm
amongst the true and obedient and faithful Subjects . . . hath obstinately,
frowardly [disposed to go counter to what is demanded; perverse;
ungovernable; evilly disposed-interestingly, Fisher's attainder legislation
used the word "maliciously" rather than "forwardly," see An Act for the
Attainder of the Bishop of Rochester and Others, 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 22
(Eng.)], and contemptuously refused to make and receive such corporal oath
as was ordained to be accepted of every Subject of this Realm for the surety
and establishment of the succession of our said Sovereign Lord.
Id. (alteration to original).
78 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 22 (Eng.).
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the next statute of significance was the statute entitled An Act
Concerning the King's Highness to be Supreme Head of the
Church of England and to Have Authority to Reform and Redress
All Errors, Heresies, and Abuses in the Same.79

C. The Act of Supremacy
The statute was relatively brief and read in its entirety:
ALBEIT the King's Majesty justly and rightfully is & oweth to
be the supreme head of the Church of England, and so is
recognized by the Clergy of this Realm in their convocations;
yet nevertheless for corroboration & confirmation thereof, and
for increase of virtue in Christ's Religion within this Realm of
England, and to repress & extirpe all errors, heresies, and
other enormities & abuses heretofore used in the same, [bje it
enacted by authority of this present Parliament that the King
our Sovereign Lord, his heirs, and successors, Kings of this
Realm, shall be taken, accepted, & reputed the only supreme
head in earth of the Church of England called Anglicana
Ecclesia, and shall have & enjoy annexed and united to the
Imperial Crown of this Realm as well the title and style
thereof, as all Honors, Dignities, preeminences, jurisdictions,
privileges, authorities, immunities, profits, and commodities
to the said dignity of supreme head of the same Church
belonging and appertaining: And that our said Sovereign
Lord, his heirs, and successors, Kings of this Realm, shall
have full power & authority from time to time to visit,
repress, redress, reform, order, correct, restrain, and amend
all such errors, heresies, abuses, offences, contempts, and
enormities whatsoever they be, which by any manner
spiritual authority or jurisdiction ought or may lawfully be
reformed, repressed, ordered, redressed, corrected, restrained,
or amended, most to the pleasure of Almighty God the
increase of virtue in Christ's Religion and for the
[conservation] of the peace, unity, and tranquility of this
Realm: any usage, custom, foreign laws, foreign authority,
prescription, or any other thing or things to the contrary
hereof notwithstanding.80

1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.) ("Act of Supremacy").
8 Id. (alteration to original) (emphasis added).
7
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This was the first of the two statutes cited in Thomas More's
indictment.8 1 The title synopsizes the content of the statute's
substance by announcing that the law confirmed that the
temporal sovereign, i.e., the king, was also the supreme head of
the Anglican Church "in earth."82 Clearly the king held this status
only in England and nowhere else, since Parliament obviously
could not legislate for all of Christendom or for the entire world. It
needs to be emphasized here that Parliament did not make the
king the Supreme Head of the Church; rather, it declared its
recognition of "the fact" that he was the head of the Church. This
formulation may have anticipated the objection that the subject
matter was within the province of the ecclesiastical rather than
the civil authorities; however, it could be argued that this
formulation was a simple recognition of what many ecclesiastical
authorities, at least in England, considered to be the case. While
the practical effect between making and recognizing may be the
same, the selection of the wording suggested that even Parliament
had to acknowledge some limit on its competence and authority in
making laws.
Nevertheless, if Thomas More and anyone else disagreed
with this acknowledgement of the king's title, they would be
disagreeing with a Parliamentary opinion that the king was an
ecclesiastical official and therefore, head of the Church in
England. Knowing that this statute had a bearing on ecclesial
matters on which Parliament had not previously legislated, other
English law and precedent needs to be considered, as they had a
definite bearing on the Parliamentary recognition codified in the
Act of Supremacy.
It is relevant to note that the Act of Supremacy was at odds
with the Magna Carta of 1215, in that King John assented to the
freedom of the Church which was beyond the control of the
temporal authorities including the king. 83 Although the exercise of
81 See More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18,

§ 2,

at

176.
1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.).
Magna Carta, 1215, John 1, (Eng.). The very first substantive provision of the
Magna Carta states,
82
8

FIRST, THAT WE HAVE GRANTED TO GOD, and by this present charter
have confirmed for us and our heirs in perpetuity, that the English Church
shall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished, and its liberties
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Henry's understanding of his temporal authority ignored the
provisions dealing with the freedom of the Church contained in
the Magna Carta, this fact did not escape the eye of Thomas More
unimpaired. That we wish this so to be observed, appears from the fact that
of our own free will, before the outbreak of the present dispute between us
and our barons, we granted and confirmed by charter the freedom of the
Church's elections-a right reckoned to be of the greatest necessity and
importance to it-and caused this to be confirmed by Pope Innocent III. This
freedom we shall observe ourselves, and desire to be observed in good faith by
our heirs in perpetuity.
Id. That final substantive provision asserts,
IT IS ACCORDINGLY OUR WISH AND COMMAND that the English
Church shall be free, and that men in our kingdom shall have and keep all
these liberties, rights, and concessions, well and peaceably in their fulness
and entirety for them and their heirs, of us and our heirs, in all things and all
places for ever.
Id. The reference to the pope makes clear that while King John (1166-1216)
acknowledged in the Magna Carta the authority of Rome in at least some ecclesiastical
matters, Henry unilaterally abandoned this principle with the Act of Supremacy. A. E.
Dick Howard has a different take on this; as he says, "the use of the phrase 'English
Church,' in contrast to the language 'Holy Church' in earlier charters, is evidence of the
sense of a distinctively English Church, a consciousness which became reality in the
reign of Henry VIII." A. E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 20

(1998). Of course throughout Christendom, the churches in the lands of Christendom
had their own local identity and particular authority even to this day in accordance
with the now codified Code of Canon Law; however, to say that there was some
particular division between London and Rome that was long-standing before the
divorce between Henry and Catherine presents a questionable claim. Professor Howard
does not consider in his brief commentary on the Church-State issues what King Henry
himself asserted in his Defence of the Seven Sacraments about Rome and its
relationship to England. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Still, the role of the
Magna Carta should be neither overemphasized or minimized or dismissed in these
matters. Moreover, the relationship between Rome and England went through various
forms of closeness and distance, and as McKechnie contends, after the Norman
Conquest, "the English Church was brought into closer contact with Rome, and with
the ecclesiastical ideals prevailing on the Continent." WILLIAM SHARP McKECHNIE,
MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 16 (2d ed.

1914). From McKechnie's view, the English clergy did look within England for guidance
for centuries, but it was to the Archbishop of Canterbury and not the king. Id.
McKechnie offers the further insight that during the early second millennium, the
spiritual and temporal authorities were "indissolubly locked together" because the
bishops often had a dual allegiance: one to the crown since most bishops were vassals
of the king as holders of Crown baronies, and one to the Rome since they were prelates
of the Holy Church. Id. at 17. The point here is that the Magna Carta provisions just
cited were at the insistence of the clergy who sought protection not from Rome, but
from the Crown. As McKechnie further states, "A new definition of the frontier between
the spiritual and temporal powers was the outcome of John's need of allies on the eve of
Magna Carta." Id. at 19.
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who remarked about the violation of the Magna Carta at his
trial. 84 Notwithstanding the Act of Supremacy, it was still
necessary for the Parliament to enact one more piece of general
legislation since this statute, by itself, contained no enforcement
mechanism; rather, it simply acknowledged a new title held by the
king. But Parliament remedied this matter by enacting a further
complementary statute entitled An Act Whereby Diverse Offences
Be Made High Treason and Taking Away All Sanctuaries for All
Manner of High Treason. 85 This was the tool that put teeth into
the Parliamentary recognition that the king was in charge of
ecclesiastical affairs.

D. The Act of High Treason.
This was the second statute cited in Thomas More's
indictment.8 6 Calling attention to the presence of "shameful
slanders," "perils[,] or imminent danger or dangers" which might
be directed to the King, Anne Boleyn, and their children, the law
specified that certain acts, utterances (words spoken or written),
and deeds could constitute high treason and were therefore
punishable by death if other conditions were satisfied.8 7 Once
again the word "maliciously" played a prominent role in this
84 See THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18, at 42, 66, 89, 117, 207. The
status of the Magna Carta and whether it was some kind of juridical document is an
important question that McKechnie tackled. McKECHNIE, supra note 83, at 104-09.
While not definitive, McKechnie's discussion is very useful, as he covers parallels with
the English conciliar efforts before the establishment of Parliament. Id. He also
discusses the charter in the context of a treaty. Id. He also considers it as akin to a
declaration of rights. Id. Perhaps the best characterization of it was that "it was
something definite and utilitarian-a legal document with specific remedies for current
evils. To English lawyers and historians of a later age it became something intangible
and ideal, a symbol for the essential principles of the English Constitution, a palladium
of English liberties." Id. at 120. McKechnie identifies its great value by enunciating "a
definite body of law, claiming to be above the King's will and admitted as such by
[King] John." Id. at 123. Here McKechnie relies on A. V. Dicey's idea that the charter
enunciated "the reign of law" or the "rule of law." Id. at 124. Of course, McKechnie
points out that one of the greatest defects of the Magna Carta was the fact that it had
no means of sanction or enforcement against the king. Id. at 129. But as we have seen,
neither did the Act of Supremacy enacted by Henry's Parliament, but it was still the
law to be enforced by another, viz., the Act of High Treason.
85 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (Eng.) ("Act of High Treason").
86 See More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18, § 3, at
177.
87 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (Eng.).
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statute as these additional conditions were elaborated. The
pertinent text of the statute reads as follows:
FOR AS MUCH as it is most necessary, both for common
policy and duty of subjects, above all things to prohibit,
provide, restrain, and extinct all manner of shameful
slanders, perils, or imminent danger or dangers which might
grow, happen, or arise to their Sovereign Lord the King, the
Queen, or their heirs . . . Be it therefore enacted, by the
assent and consent of our Sovereign Lord the King and the
Lords spiritual and temporal and Commons in this present
[P]arliament assembled and by the authority of the same,
that if any person or persons after the first day of February
next coming, do maliciously wish, will, or desire by words or
writing, or by craft imagine, invent, practice, or attempt, any
bodily harm to be done or committed to the King's most royal
person, the Queen, or their heirs apparent, or to deprive them
or any of them of the dignity, title, or name of their royal
estates, or slanderously & maliciously publish & pronounce,
by express writing or words, that the King our Sovereign Lord
should be heretic, schismatic, [t]yrant, infidel, or [u]surper of
the Crown .

. .

. That then every such person and persons so

offending in any the premises after the said first day of
February, their aiders, counselors, consenters, and abettors,
being thereof lawfully convicted according to the Laws and
Customs of this Realm, shall be adjudged traitors; and that
every such offence in any the premises that shall be committed
or done after the said first day of February, shall be reputed,
accepted, and adjudged high [t]reason, [a]nd the offenders
therein, and their aiders, consenters, counselors, and
abettors, being lawfully convicted of any such offence as is
aforesaid, shall have and suffer such pains of [d]eath and
other penalties as is limited and accustomed in cases of High
Treason.8 8
Because of the significance of this statute in the prosecution
of Thomas More, I will offer a detailed explanation of its substance
in the third part of this Article. However, it is important to note
here that prior to the enactment of this statute, deeds were
88 Id.
(alteration to original) (emphasis added to highlight the elements allegedly
violated by Thomas More); see also More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY
JURY, supra note 18, §§ 2-3, at 176-77.
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essential for prosecuting cases alleging the commission of high
treason; however, with this 1534 legislation, spoken words alone
became actionable in a prosecution of this crime. 89

E. Other Legislation
Although not having a direct bearing on Thomas More,
additional legislation was enacted by Parliament ensuring that
the royal plans surrounding "the King's great matter" would be
followed, if not enthusiastically, then, at least out of sheer
obedience. While not having the same widespread profile as the
statute requiring the oath, Parliament in short order also enacted
legislation mandating the payment of "first fruits" [i.e., first of
annual incomes] by those in ecclesiastical office or positions. 90
Traditionally these payments were sent to Rome or to
ecclesiastical officials in England. However, this legislation
arrested the payments to Rome and redirected them to the
Crown. 9 ' Once the legislation went into effect, the payments
would be made for the support, maintenance, and defense of the
"royal estate" of the king. 92 The effect of this statute confirmed
that the Crown, not the pope, was in charge of matters ecclesial as
well as temporal, and it worked in tandem with the Act of
Supremacy. Unlike the statutes addressed so far, this one went on
for several pages detailing who or which offices were responsible
for paying "first fruits."93
Not only would this legislation have an impact on those
holding high church office, but it would also affect those who held
academic posts-since members of the clergy were the
predominant holders of academic posts at Oxford and Cambridge.
It was clear that this law would not only provide the Crown with a
new source of income, but it would also divert payments to Rome
and keep this wealth within England, which would have otherwise
gone abroad to Rome, for the use of the king or for the purposes to
which the Crown would direct them. This statute would clearly
have an impact on the coffers of the universal Church in Rome, a
8

9

Thornley, supra note 22, at 109.
1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 3 (Eng.).

91 Id.
92

9

Id.
Id.
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matter about which the King and his complacent Parliament were
surely aware. At this stage, I will now consider the language of the
two principal statutes addressing Sir Thomas More-i.e., those
named in his indictment: the Act of Supremacy and the Act of
High Treason, which imposed the death penalty of hanging,
drawing, and quartering 9 4-and propose reasonable and objective
constructions of their words and syntax.
II. THE LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTES NAMED IN MORE'S
INDICTMENT AND THEIR REASONABLE CONSTRUCTIONS

A. Background
I now turn to a more detailed consideration of the two
statutes named in the indictment of Thomas More (viz., the Act of
Supremacy and the Act of High Treason) and offer what I suggest
is an objective interpretation of these based on the plain meaning
of their words, 95 the underlying intent, and the intended purpose
as accurately presented by the words used. As these were the texts
that led to the conviction and execution of Thomas More, they
merit a close reading and a dispassionate interpretation. A basic
question concerns whether More violated these statutes by
running afoul of their intent and purpose, as determined and
defined by the words employed in the text. The language chosen
by anyone, including Parliament, typically indicates something
about the drafter's intention, i.e., the thinking that undergirds the
language that is selected and the objectives toward which the
chosen language is directed. In the context of More's prosecution,
the objective was to obtain, voluntarily or otherwise through a
variety of pressures, 96 compliance with the King's will by some
kind of public agreement or approval concerning his marital state,
his claimed supremacy as head of the Church, the line of
94 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.); 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (Eng.). It is uncertain when
the King did so, but prior to the executions of Cardinal Fisher and Sir Thomas More,
King Henry commanded that both be beheaded only thereby sparing them of the
ignominy and the torture of the standard death sentence for those convicted of high
treason. See REYNOLDS, supra note 55, at 376.
95 See supra text accompanying note 19.
96 By "otherwise" I mean the application of pressure, such as duress or threats,
that inclines a person to the conclusion that it would be best to do what the civil
authority, i.e., the state, desires, suggests, or outright commands.
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succession, and the break with Rome. However, it is the texts
themselves that are determinative, rather than possible meanings
which could have been conveyed by the use of specific language.
For example, if a legislature deems it unlawful to kill another
person, it can specify this with different formulations that
essentially mean the same thing. Consequently, the legislature
can simply state that "it is a criminal offense punishable by the
law to kill another person." As this language makes no exception
for self-defense, the legislature could reformulate by stating that
"it is a criminal offense punishable by the law to kill another
person unless the killing is done in self-defense." Another option
would be for the legislature to state that "it is a criminal offense
punishable by the law to kill another person unless it is absolutely
necessary to do so in self-defense." While the tenor of the second
and third examples is similar, interpreters could be expected to
argue over the presence and absence of the phrase "absolutely
necessary" and the phrase's impact on the meaning of the law.
Once again we see that words that are ultimately used in
legislation mean something.
While English law has held onto an interpretative
methodology that largely focuses on the words of the text,9 7 there
was movement as early as the late sixteenth century during the
reign of Elizabeth I when the English courts were prepared to
explore more deeply into the intention and the objectives of the
legislation being reviewed by the court. For example, in Heydon's
Case98 of 1584, the court developed the so-called "mischief rule" for
7 But see Pepper v. Hart, [1993] AC 593 (H.L.) (modifying the "exclusionary rule"
which stated that legislative reports of Parliament could not be considered by courts
when construing statutes). See also Johan Steyn, Pepper v. Hart:A Re-examination, 21
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 59 (2001) (questioning that review of legislators remarks can
provide insight into legislative intention and arguing the case for less reliance on these
remarks in order to avoid constitution objections); Scott C. Styles, The Rule of
Parliament:Statutory Interpretation after Pepper v. Hart, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
151 (1994) (suggesting that most statements are made by Government ministers and
therefore reflect the executive opinion rather than the legislature's opinion). Styles
further suggests that this would unduly influence judges to see the executive
perspective but not necessarily that of general members of Parliament. Id. Moreover,
the author expresses concern that too much reliance on these statements would make
judges "mere reflecting mirrors" and thus argues the case for judicial independence and
the preservation of the duty of the courts to determine the meaning of the legislation.
Id. at 157.
98 (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a. As the court stated in pertinent part,
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interpreting statutes.99 Although it had not yet been decided at
the time of More's trial, Heydon's Case provides a pertinent
insight into background investigation of statutes passed by
Parliament when their meaning and application have a great
impact on the commonweal. While statutes were by no means
uncommon during the Tudor reign, as I have already
demonstrated, the common law was still largely viewed as the
nucleus of the English legal system. Thus, the Heydon's Case court
raised as its first point in statutory construction the need to know
what was the principle in the common law before the statute was
enacted addressing this item.10 0 In essence, this element of the
Heydon's Case decision presents the issue of what was the
previous law on point and what did it say. The second element
presented by the court necessitates the investigation of what
mischief did the previous law dealing with the subject matter fail
to take stock of, or to put it another way, what was the defect of
the common law which failed to give an answer to or otherwise
satisfactorily address and remedy the matters to which
Parliament responded?o' The third point is this: what remedy did
the legislation provide in order to address the lacuna in the
common law? 102 In the context of the statutes dealing with "the
King's great matter," the remedies of the legislation enacted by
Henry's Parliament were designed to compel in public fashion

And it was resolved by them, that for the sure and true (a) interpretation of
all statutes in general (be they penal (B) or beneficial, restrictive or enlarging
of the common law,) four things are to be discerned and considered: (b) 1st.
What was the common law before the making of the Act. (c) 2nd. What was
the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide. 3rd[.]
What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure the disease
of the commonwealth. And, 4th. The true reason of the remedy; and then the
office of all the Judges is always to make such (d) construction as shall
suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief, and pro privato
commodo [for private or personal gain], and to add force and life to the cure
and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act, pro bono
publico [for the public welfare or good].
Id. at 638.
99 Id. The case was decided in 1584, during the reign of Henry's second daughter,
Elizabeth 1 (1558-1603). Id.
100 Heydon's Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637; 3 Co. Rep. 7 a.
101

Id.

102

Id.
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compliance with the King's will, a royal will that was in conflict
with the Act of Treason of 1351103 and the Magna Carta.104 The
final matter raised by the Heydon's Case court, which is strongly
related to the third point, presents a provocative question: what is
the true reason for the legislative remedy?10 5 In other words, what
were the motivation and justification for making this law? These
points offer additional tools for investigating the meaning of the
words of the statute and the intention and objectives that
undergird the words selected so that a more accurate
interpretation of the statute can be achieved.
In fine, given the background of Heydon's Case, the
interpreter must consider carefully the text promulgated by the
legislature and ask the most fundamental question not formally
raised but implied by the court in Heydon's Case: what do these
words mean in their ordinary or general application so that they
fairly apprize the king's subjects of their duties to their sovereign
given the context that the law has changed as a result of this
statute? Being satisfied that there is something beyond the plain
or ordinary meaning of the language of the statute raises a crucial
concern that legislation is supposed to be understood by the
ordinary person who is put on general notice regarding the
meaning, i.e., the application, of the law to each person. 106 In other
words, fair notice of the law's obligations and requirements is in
order, due to the fact that statutes in the Anglo-American
tradition have a general application and most, if not all, those
subject to law are required to observe. With these considerations
in mind, I now turn to the first statute mentioned in More's
indictment, the Act of Supremacy.

See discussion supranote 22.
See discussion supranote 83.
105 Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 637.
106 See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-150 (1961). In chapter seven, Hart
develops a rule of general application regarding the exclusion of motor vehicles, but
demonstrates how the average person must assess certain factors to determine the
applicability of the statute to the specific case and deal with the ambiguity ("open
texture") of the language used. Id. Justice Holmes had this to say about general
application and notice, "it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the
world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to
do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line
should be clear." McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
103
104

2014] STATUTORY MAKING AND INTERPRETATION

577

B. The Act of Supremacy
As I turn to the first statute named in the indictment, a
question presented by Heydon's Case surfaces: what mischief did
the prior law not address thereby necessitating Parliament to
enact this statute dealing with the king's title? On its face, the
statute did something never addressed by the common law, or for
that matter earlier legislation: an act of Parliament recognized-it
did not make-the king to be the Supreme Head of the Church in
England. By this acknowledgment, King Henry was substituted
for the pope; however, this was contrary to the previous royal
declaration regarding the freedom of the Church from the
temporal authorities as expressed with abundant clarity in the
Magna Carta.10 7 So if the Magna Carta had been the state of
English law in the past (and it was to some degree, particularly
when matters of religious freedom were the bone of contention,
although it has generally been considered a law that would not
trump legislation enacted by Parliament 0 8 ), what mischief was
the Act of Supremacy designed to address that was not in the
earlier law? As the Act of Supremacy's fundamental objective
deals with the recognition of the temporal sovereign as the head of
the church in England by an act of Parliament, was this
legislation an appropriate solution to some unaddressed
"mischief'? In short, was there mischief necessitating a legislative
response? It would seem that there was no problem on this matter
for centuries, that is, the intra-ecclesial establishment of papal
authority was not of a concern to England, her people, or her
sovereign. This point is all the more evident when one considers
the state of affairs earlier in the reign of Henry VIII. Specifically,
in 1521, Henry himself had acknowledged the role of Rome and
the pope in his work In Defence of the Seven Sacraments and in his
correspondence with Pope Leo X.109 What mischief had then
107

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.

108 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. This is how Henry expressed the role
of Rome and the Pope in his May 21, 1521 letter to Pope Leo X:

Most Holy Father: I most humbly commend myself to you, and devoutly kiss
your blessed feet. Whereas we believe that no duty is more incumbent on a
Catholic sovereign than to preserve and increase the Christian faith and
religion . ...
[herein follows a condemnation of Luther] we were so deeply
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emerged between 1521 and 1534, was not identified with any
helpful specificity in the legislation of 1534.
The "mischief," if there were any, resided in the fact that the
King wanted to "change his woman" by divorcing Queen Catherine
so that he could marry Anne Boleyn.1 10 The King was familiar
with papal dispensations, which allowed him to marry his brother
Arthur's widow, Catherine, in the first place. But if he could not
get a second dispensation from Rome to undo the first
dispensation, he would merely avoid the inconvenience of going to
the former ecclesiastical authority by declaring that he as the
sovereign, i.e., the temporal authority, was now the only essential
ecclesiastical authority who was supreme head of the Church in

grieved at this heinous crime of the German nation ... and for the sake of the
Holy Apostolic See, that we bent all our thoughts and energies on uprooting
in every possible way, this cockle, this heresy from the Lord's flock . . . . But
convinced that, ... in our zeal for the Catholic faith and our devotion to the
Apostolic See, we had not yet done enough, we determined to show by our
own writings our attitude towards Luther and our opinion of his vile books; to
manifest more openly to all the world that we shall ever defend and uphold,
not only by force of arms but by the resources of our intelligence and our
services as a Christian, the Holy Roman Church.
Letter from King Henry VIII to Pope Leo X (May 21, 1521), in DEFENCE OF THE SEVEN
SACRAMENTS, supra note 20, at 152, 154. In the Epistle Dedicatory of Henry's book, the
King said this:
We have meditated therein; that, under Your Protection, who are Christ's
Vicar upon Earth, it may pass the public Censure . . . . Whether or no any

Thing is effectually done in this, shall rest to Your Holiness's Judgment: If
We have erred in any Thing, We offer it to be corrected as may please Your
Holiness.
King Henry VIII, The Epistle Dedicatory, in DEFENCE OF THE SEVEN SACRAMENTS,

supra note 20, at 182, 184. Chapter two of the King's book was on the papacy, and it
condemned and countered Luther's views by stating:
For he [Luther] cannot deny, but that all the Faithful honour and
acknowledge the sacred Roman See for their Mother and Supreme, nor does
Distance of Place or Dangers in the Way hinder Access thereunto. For if those
who come hither from the Indies tell us Truth, the Indians themselves . . . do
submit to the See of Rome . . . Truly, if any will look upon antient
Monuments, or read the Histories of former Times, he may easily find, that
since the Conversion of the World, all Churches in the Christian World have
been obedient to the See of Rome.
DEFENCE OF THE SEVEN SACRAMENTS, supranote 20, at 202, 204.
110 BOLT, supra note 16. The "wanting to change his woman" language refers to a

line attributed to Thomas Cromwell in the Bolt screenplay for A Man for All Seasons.

Id.
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England and could, thus, determine whether he was married in
the eyes of God and the Church or not. Previously in his 1521 book
on the seven sacraments, the King acknowledged that the pope
was Peter, i.e., the head of the Church and the Vicar of Christ,
rather than the temporal sovereign, the king.1 11 So if the existing
head of the Church were unable or unwilling to comply with
satisfying the "mischief' that Henry had identified, the
Parliament would turn against Rome and recognize that the King
possessed the means to exercise the mechanisms he needed, viz., a
dispensation of some kind-a divorce-to marry Anne Boleyn.
With the sympathetic assistance of Parliament, the King became,
by a statement of recognition rather than an enactment of
making, the competent authority that now held the exclusive
power to dissolve his marriage of twenty-some years. 112
When Henry needed help from the pope, he was not shy to
ask for this assistance as he did when he chose to marry
Catherine of Aragon, his late brother's widow, and when it was
thought that a papal dispensation was needed to do so.
Unmistakably
these
actions
demonstrated
the
King's
acknowledgment that the pope was Peter and that the temporal
sovereign, Henry, was not. These activities and earlier
acknowledgements of the King supply probative evidence that the
pope rather than King Henry was the head of the Church. But
when Henry's temporal and personal interests began to wander
and expand from his earlier position regarding the authority of
Rome, and when he could not get Rome's consent regarding the
dissolution of his marriage to Catherine in a timely fashion that
comported with his schedule, he took matters into his own hands
and produced an artificial "mischief' mandating legislative action.
So with the help of Parliament, he declared himself the competent
authority, which had the exclusive power to dissolve his marriage
of twenty-some years and declare it invalid. But was this

nM See supranote 20 and accompanying text.
The pertinent Parliamentary language asserted that "the King's Majesty justly
and rightfully is and oweth to be the supreme head of the Church of England, and so is
recognized by the Clergy of this Realm in their convocations . . . shall be taken,
accepted, and reputed the only supreme head in earth of the Church of England." 1534,
26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.).
112
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situation, in accordance with Heydon's Case, a mischief requiring
a Parliamentary response?
While most interpreters would likely be open to considering
the circumstances militating a sensible change that would
necessitate legislation to further the common good, 113 there is no
substantive justification offered as to why the supreme authority
of the Church should be divested from the spiritual authority and
transferred to the temporal one. After all, the King was married to
Queen Catherine and he had an heir, the Princess Mary, who, as
it would turn out, would become the first Queen of England. If
there were some mischief that was not addressed by the earlier
law, it is unclear what it was. The threat of dynastic wars that
Henry feared did not materialize when two women-ironically
Henry's daughters by different women-became queen. Mary
Tudor, who became Mary I, reigned for five years, and her halfsister, Elizabeth I, reigned for forty-five years. In both cases,
neither queen had to contend with dynastic wars. Henry
acknowledged as much when Parliament enacted the Third Act of
Succession. 114 The lack of specificity about what the mischief was
prompts the question: was there a mischief in the first place that
required a response by the legislature, or was there some catalyst
other than a "mischief' that prompted the legislation used to
condemn Thomas More? This question becomes all the more
poignant when one considers the fact that Parliament did not
make the king Supreme Head; rather it merely corroborated,
confirmed, or recognized this dubious claim without specifying any
competent authority for doing so, as I have already mentioned.
The justification for altering the law is, in fact, nonexistent. There
was no mischief that the new law was designed to combat. What
was offered for the validation of changing the law was a bold
assertion and nothing more. While there were corroborations
offered by many of the clergy in England (who undoubtedly
considered the alternatives they would face by denying the

113 For an interesting take on this point see Andrew Beck, The Common Good in
Law and Legislation, in THE KING'S GOOD SERVANT: PAPERS READ TO THE THOMAS
MORE SOCIETY OF LONDON 71-82 (Richard O'Sullivan et al. eds., 1948).
114 1544, 35 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.).
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King'1 5 ), it is clear that the ultimate cleric, the Pope, was not one
of them who shared in the false claim.
Given the fact that this legislation further empowered the
King to wipe out all "errors, heresies, abuses, offences, contempts,
and enormities whatsoever they be"116 and knowing that he had a
great deal of enforcement mechanisms at his disposal to obtain
compliance with statutes whose validity was questionable, the
interpreter can straightaway conclude that clergy, who recognized
in their convocations and attested to this title, did not have much
choice because any disagreement with the King's wish, as subtle
and respectful as it might be, would be met with the enforcement
power of the state. This was evident from Henry's extortion from
the clergy made possible by the praemunire legislation.117
Moreover, as the self-made head of the Church in England, the
King now possessed the means to discipline any cleric who
disagreed with him on anything.118 It was patent that any
recourse against this legislation by appeal to Rome, which would
have been the traditional means of challenging actions against the
Church, would be met harshly by the King, and most likely with
great force. Henry now had the political authority to arrest anyone
from resorting to "any usage, custom, foreign laws, foreign
authority, prescription, or any other thing or things to the
contrary hereof notwithstanding."'19 Should any cleric be inclined
to pursue the traditional grievance mechanism that would involve
Rome, he would be confronted by the force generated by the
legislation. In short, the King, through Parliament's legislation,
indicated that the due process of the past, viz., appeals to Rome on
ecclesiastical matters, would be countered by the state, which
Henry directed with Parliament's assistance.

" One concrete example of how the king could instill fear was through the
application of the praemunire legislation enacted by Henry's Parliament. See J. A. Guy,
Henry VIII and the PraemunireManoeuvres of 1530-1531, 97 ENG. HIST. REV. 481, 481503 (1982). In short, this method of extortion would enable the clergy to avoid the
wrath of the king but at an expensive price. Id.; see also REYNOLDS, supra note 18, at
166-82.
116 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.).
117 SCARISBRICK, supra note 29, at 235, 273-75, 278, 296-97.
I's Id.
119

1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.).
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From Thomas More's perspective, the most problematic
element of the legislation was the recognition of a layman, in this
case the king, as the head of the Church in England. However, the
Act of Supremacy had no stated means of enforcing its terms, but
this problem was only temporary, as further legislation would
remedy this. The nature of the enforcement for the Act of
Supremacy against More was contained in the second statute of
the indictment, namely the Act of High Treason to which I now
turn.

C. The Act of High Treason
This statute provided the enforcement muscle to implement
the King's objectives contained in the Act of Supremacy. The Act
of High Treason consequently requires careful linguistic analysis.
While it is a relatively long statute, there are only a few elements
that pertained to cases like the former Lord Chancellor's. More
was aware of this, but he realized, nevertheless, that he had to
study carefully the intricacies of the legislation in order to avoid
the lethal traps that it contained. Evidently he did this with great
astuteness. But even his legal aptitude could not protect him from
the tyrant King whose goals were to be attained regardless of the
law. Through his careful review of the text, More understood how
these complexities could apply to him and to his fellow
countrymen if the law's provisions were not carefully observed. In
the context of these two statutes that would unnaturally hasten
More's death, he acknowledged that it was important to read
prudently and precisely the text of the statutes in a letter to his
daughter, Margaret, so that he and everyone else could
comprehend their impact as to which words and deeds of the
king's subjects would or could be criminalized. 120 Depending on
what words were used, and how they were to be understood, it

120 Letter from Thomas More to Margaret Roper (April 17, 1534), in FOR ALL
SEASONS: SELECTED LETTERS OF THOMAS MORE 224-28 (Stephen Smith ed., 2012). In
his April 17, 1534 letter to his daughter Margaret written after his imprisonment in
the Tower, More discussed his recent interrogation about the Act of Succession and the
oath, and he informed her that he "desired the sight of the oath" and then "the sight of
the Act of Succession." Id. He then read them but once he found the need to concur
with the marriage to Anne Boleyn and the stripping of the authority of Rome, he could
not take the oath. Id.

2014] STATUTORY MAKING AND INTERPRETATION

583

could be possible for a person faithful to God, the Church, and the
king to comply. But after reading the substance of the statutes,
More subsequently acknowledged that he could neither agree with
the king's new title nor publicly declare so as many others were

willing to do. 12 1
However, he devised a way out of his predicament-saying
nothing and doing nothing pertaining to "the King's great
matter"-that would not trigger the Act of High Treason's firing
pin. Thus, if he were to remain silent and say nothing publicly
about the content of the Act of Supremacy, he thought he would
avoid the triggering mechanism for the application of the Act of
High Treason, but, as will be seen, the prosecutorial action that
was formed by pressure from the King would be satisfied with
nothing less than conviction, regardless of whether the statute's
provisions were violated or not. But this plan of the Crown was in
conflict with the most objective reading of the statute. I now turn
to consideration of the legislation's wording.
The first element of the Act of High Treason made it an
offense to "maliciously" wish, will, or desire-either by words (i.e.,
oral communications) or writing, craft, imagination, invention,
practice, or attempt-any bodily harm on the King, Anne Boleyn,
or their issue. 122 Although this is a critical element of the statute,
I have already demonstrated why this portion did not apply to the
prosecution of Thomas More, because he did nothing in word or
deed that would lead to, or result in, the bodily harm of the King,
his new wife, or their children. In addition, there is nothing in the
record of his case that indicates the former Lord Chancellor was
being prosecuted for planning or executing something that would
bring physical harm to the King and his family. Even the despotic
Henry and his allies realized this. As the record of More's
tribulations indicated, he prayed for the King's welfare until the
end of his earthly life, and this activity would not be that of a
person who wished harm upon the King, Anne Boleyn, or their
children. 123
Id.
1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (Eng.).
123 Letter from Thomas More to Margaret Roper (May 2 or 3, 1535), in FOR ALL
SEASONS: SELECTED LETTERS OF THOMAS MORE, supra note 120, at 288. Evidence of
More's sentiments, of which the authorities likely would have had knowledge, was
121
122
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If the authorities were interested in manufacturing an
admission that More did intend, in some way, such harm, they
could have used force or duress or torture to obtain the
information that was needed. However, the use of torture was
something that was technically forbidden by the law.124 These
methods, especially the rack (initially referred to as the Duke of
Exeter's Daughter),125 were thought to be a means for the state to
find out information but not for the law to use in the exercise of
due process.126 Of course, this disagreement between politics and
the law did not prevent the use of torture for whatever reasons
were convenient to the state. Some years later, Blackstone
concluded that its use was a means unfit for both, as its use was
contrary to the laws of England.127 In the final analysis, this
method of duress was not imposed on More. However, it is clear
that he faced harassment in a variety of forms that were designed
to submit him into compliance with the King's desire regarding
his new title and acceptance of his new wife. The attainder
legislation that was the cause for imprisonment and confiscation
of property illustrates this point.128
It was the second action/deed element of the Act of High
Treason that clearly had a bearing on the case against Thomas
More, and it was the basis of his being tried for high treason. This
element of the statute could make a person a candidate for high
treason for engaging in actions which would maliciously by "wish,
will, or desire by words or writing, or by craft, etc." deprive the
King, Anne Boleyn, or their children "of the dignity, title, or name
of their royal estates."129 The application of this provision to the

contained in his May 2 or 3, 1535 letter, to his daughter, Margaret. Id. ("I am, said I,
the King's true faithful subject and daily beadsman and pray for his Highness and ...
all the realm. I do nobody harm, I say none harm, I think none harm, but wish
everybody good. And if this be not enough to keep a man alive, in good faith, I long not
to live.").
124 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *320-21.
125 Id. Named this because at one time John Holland, the Duke of Exeter,
was the
constable of the Tower when the torture rack was first installed and likely used in
1447. Id.
126 Id.
127 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *320-21.
128 See Guildhall Report, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra
note 18, § 1(b), at
186.
129 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (Eng.).
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case of Thomas More was that he maliciously deprived the King of
his title as Supreme Head of the Church in England. Two
questions now present themselves: (1) did Thomas More do or say
anything that deprived the King of his title? and, (2) did he do this
maliciously?
The definition of "malice" will be considered first as it is the
root word upon which "maliciously" is based. The root word
focuses on the intention or desire or attitude of a person to
accomplish evil, especially by causing injury to another person.o30
Another way of understanding the word's meaning is to perceive
in the actor an ill will or hatred by the actor toward another. 131
This would have an important bearing on More's case if there
were some evidence indicating his intention to deprive the King of
his title as Supreme Head of the Church due to ill will or hatred.
But More said nothing and did nothing based on such intent. So
let us look further at what the word can mean. Malice also meant
in Tudor times a kind of wickedness or possessing a bad
intention.132 Malice was also understood as a harmful or
dangerous quality. 133 It could also mean being full of hate, spite,
or poisonous attitude or disposition.134 In the English law of the
time of Henry, malice was also considered to be the necessary
state of mind of a person to be liable under the law for certain
harms suffered by another. 3 5 Thus, a person or an act would be
considered malicious if there were a demonstration that the
person and his intent were addicted to sentiments or acts of ill will
or hatred or hostility toward another person.13 6 Its meaning would
also be synonymous with being warlike or fierce, wicked or sinful,
poisonous, malignant, dangerous, or harmful.13 7 The person or the
act could also be malicious if it were disposed to evil.138 There was
also an understanding that malicious could mean that the person's
thought or deed was clever or artful-but directed toward an evil

130

THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY supra note 25, at 265.

131 Id.
132
133

Id.
Id.

135

Id.
Id.

136

Id.

137

Id.

134

138 Irl
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or a wicked outcome. 139 For someone or something to be labeled
malicious, the person or other thing could be malignant, virulent,
or harmful. 140
Hence, the deed, or the thought, or the expression of opinion
that is done maliciously would essentially be done wickedly or
sinfully or pursued with ill will in mind. Especially with regard to
actions, the action would be maliciously done if done fiercely or
violently or with fierceness and hatred in mind. These would have
been the meanings of the words malice, malicious, and maliciously
during the reign of Henry VIII.141 With these understandings of
the word's meaning in place, the question is whether More did or
said anything maliciously?
As it turns out, his indictment relied on two matters that
appear not to be covered by the language of this statue: his silence
and his use of the "two-edged sword" remark. But, neither was
done maliciously nor were they the sorts of things addressed by
the Act of High Treason. The question now becomes what did the
law say, if anything, about silence and the expression actually
used by More. I will turn to this inquiry in the subsequent fourth
part, but I must first look at one other element of the Act of High
Treason that might have a bearing on More's prosecution.
The third element addressed in the act was directed toward
the slanderously and maliciously (i.e., wickedly, sinfully, in a
spirit of ill will, mischievously, violently, or fiercely)142 publishing
and pronouncing-by express writing or words (i.e., speech,
utterance, verbal expression, anything said at all, something said
about another person, rumor, gossip, arguing, quarrelling, verbal
altercation, expression of an idea or concept)-that the King was a
heretic, schismatic, tyrant, infidel, or usurper of the Crown. 143 By
breaking with Rome, the King was at a minimum a schismatic.
There is little to suggest that the inclination toward Protestant
139
140

Id.
Id.

141 The sources of these definitions come from The Oxford English Dictionary
focusing on the definitions of these terms that were in use from the fourteenth century
to the reign of Mary Tudor.
142 This key word's meaning has already been addressed at some length; however, I
have inserted within the brackets a condensed version of the earlier discussion about
the meaning of "maliciously."
143 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (Eng.).
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theology and beliefs did not occur until the reign of Edward VI;
however, if Henry were inclined to change these beliefs, for
example the nature and number of the sacraments, he might have
also been viewed as a heretic. Thus, calling him in some fashion
one of these derogatory names would have activated this part of
the Act of High Treason as well. Although he undoubtedly had
grave concerns about Henry's threatened and ultimate breakschism-with Rome, Sir Thomas More did not disclose his
thoughts on the matter in any fashion. By breaking with Rome,
Henry in fact earned the title of schismatic by his own deeds. So in
this sense it would not have been productive for the prosecution to
have brought up the issue of the King being called a schismatic.
But More did nothing and said nothing that could be construed as
him calling the King any of these derogatory names that were
punishable as acts of high treason. Denying the title of Supreme
Head of the Church would prove to be sufficient for the
prosecution.
The fourth and fifth elements of the Act of High Treason
could not have been addressed in More's prosecution (and were
not) because there was no evidence or suggestion that he in any
fashion rebelliously detained or interfered with those properties of
the King or those instruments of war and defense that are
catalogued in these elements of the statute. 144 Indeed, this
segment of the Act of High Treason was geared to acts of violence
and rebellion, in which case the accused's actions were designed to
deny the king his means of making war and defending himself and
the country. 145
Since it was the Act of High Treason working in tandem with
the title given to the king by the Act of Supremacy, Thomas
More's fate as a traitor could lead to conviction if More had
deprived the King of his self-assumed title: Supreme Head of the
Church of England. The fundamental issue here is whether More
in fact deprived the King of his title by some declaration that

144 Id.

145 See Thornley, supra note 22, at 106. As she stated, "The clause as to detaining
royal castles or munitions of war was useful as a check on attempted rebellion, and it
made the law more stringent than it had previously been by making a bare detainer
treason; previously, forcible resistance had been necessary to constitute the offence."
Id.
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Henry could not be the Supreme Head of the Church in England
and did he do so maliciously?146 This question can be addressed
now by considering the record of the indictments, interrogations,
and additional evidence presented at More's trial.
III. WAS THE CONVICTION OF SIR THOMAS MORE SUPPORTED BY
THE LANGUAGE, INTENT, AND LAWFUL OBJECTIVES OF THE
APPLICABLE STATUTES?

The present task is now to assess whether the meanings of
the key words of the Act of Supremacy and the Act of High
Treason, as explained in the previous parts, were violated by More
in light of the evidence mustered and the objective explanation of
the statutes' provisions. In this regard, reliance on the
indictment's language and the statements given by More, the
Tower staff who oversaw the prisoner, and others who provided
testimony will need to be considered. Let me now turn to the
language of the indictment.
In Sections two and three of the indictment, the two statutes
just discussed are prominently listed and relied upon in the
prosecution of the former Lord Chancellor.147 The language of the
indictments concentrated on the issue regarding More's denying
that the King was the "sole Supreme Head on earth of the English
Church." 148 This charge was based on the allegation that Thomas
More's words and deeds deprived the King of his ecclesiastical
title, which would be an actionable offense covered by the plain
meaning of the Act of High Treason as read in conjunction with
the Act of Supremacy. The next segment of the indictment focused
on the particular language of the Act of High Treason that is
relevant: if a person should "maliciously wish[,] will[,] or desire[,]
by words or writing, or by craft . . . to deprive them (i.e., the King,
Anne Boleyn, or their lawful heirs) or any of them of the dignity[,]
title[,] or name of their royal estates," this person should be
adjudged a traitor.149

146

178.
147
148
14

See More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18,
Id. §§ 2-3, at 176-77.
Id. §§ 2-12, at 176-85.
1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 13 (Eng.).

§ 4,

at
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The next section of the indictment, Section four, is crucially
related to the previous point, for it was asserted that on May 7,
1535, that More, "seduced by diabolical instigation," "maliciously
attempted to deprive King Henry of his title of Supreme Head [of
the Church]" before Thomas Cromwell and other persons when
More "maliciously remained silent and refused to give a direct
answer."15 0 If this were the case, what was it that More said or did
which would support the conclusion that he offered some word or
made some deed that deprived the King of his title as conferred by
the Act of Supremacy when he said nothing and all that he did
was nothing? As it turns out, neither act nor word (oral or written)
was actually mentioned and identified in the indictment's text
that would correspond with and trigger the provisions of the Act of
High Treason. The "words" and "acts" which are ultimately relied
upon by the prosecution were More's failure to say anything about
the King, particularly about his title as head of the Church.
Although the language of the statute in both sixteenth century
and twenty-first century English is straightforward, one is hard
pressed to see how the silence of More constituted in fact an oral
or written expression intended to deprive the King's title of
Supreme Head of the Church in England. 151
More's silence, and only his silence, was the means by which
the Tudor officials argued that the former Lord Chancellor
"deprive[d] the said serene lord our king of a dignity, title, and
name of his royal condition, namely . .. Supreme Head on earth of

the English Church." 15 2 It was only his silence, and nothing else,
that was listed in the indictment. No words, be they written or
orally expressed, were cited or quoted. As the language of the
indictment unambiguously stated, the only manner in which
Thomas More "offended" the statute was by the fact that he
"maliciously remained completely silent and refused to give a
direct response to that question." 153 This is not a deed and silence
is not words; rather, it is the absence of a deed or words. During
150

Id. at

§ 4,

at 178-79.

151 The indictment specified that it was More's silence that constituted the
treasonable offense, for as it stated, "seduced by diabolical instigation, maliciously
attempted to deprive King Henry of his title of Supreme Head when . .. he maliciously
remained silent and refused to give direct answer." Id. at 178.
152

Id.

153

Id.
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this period of More's prosecution, the word "silence" meant, as it
does today, the fact of not speaking; a refraining from speech; an
omission of words by speech; or, an omission to write something. 154
In essence, there were no deeds or words, direct or indirect, in
which More could have been said to have deprived the King of his
title.
There were, however, some words attributed to More, which
he did not deny, that were used to reinforce the silence theory
relied upon by the prosecution: "I will not meddle with any such
matters, for I am fully determined to serve God and to think upon
His Passion and my passage out of this world." 155 But these were
not words of deprivation of the King's title; rather, they were a
refraining from stating or making any words about the King's
title. Moreover, these words do not conform to the requirements of
the Act of Supremacy or the Act of High Treason that could be
interpreted as a deprivation of the King of his title as Supreme
Head of the Church in England. In addition, there was nothing
malicious about his statement, as he expressed the view that he
was preparing to meet his Maker. The meaning of the words used
by More suggest nothing about the King's title; conversely, they
distinctly present the sentiments of a man who was no longer
concerned with the events of his world. He was preparing for his
earthly end-be it natural or artificially hastened-and for the
encounter with his Creator. This was all that he said, and these
are the only sentiments he conveyed, which had nothing to do
with Henry's person or status.
It is incomprehensible to conclude how his silence or the
words "I will not meddle with any such matter" came within the
ambit of the words of the statute and thereby constituted an
offense of the language of the Act of High Treason as
incorporating the Act of Supremacy. 5 6 There was no offense
contained in these words because they did nothing, conveyed
nothing, nor did anything that would deny anyone including the
King of his name or title as Supreme Head of the Church. Any
154

THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supranote 25, at 465-66.

155Id. at 178-79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
156 In the Guildhall Report of Thomas More's trial, his silence was characterized by
the language, "I wished to answer nothing." Guildhall Report, in THOMAS MORE'S
TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18, §2(b), at 188.
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sentiment which More uttered by these words was neutral
regarding the King's title, and consequently they were ineffective
to make the case that he had done something forbidden by the Act
of High Treason and the Act of Supremacy, i.e., depriving the king
of his title.
Furthermore, this statement was vacuous of any effort to
construe his attitude about the King's claim to be anything,
including the head of the Church. During his trial, the former
Lord Chancellor noted, quite correctly, that the language of the
statute did not cover silence but concerned only words and
deeds. 5 7 Even though his body was weakened by his extended
imprisonment, his keen legal mind still functioned well enough to
make this critical distinction regarding statutory language and its
construction. Unfortunately, this crucial distinction made no
substantive impact on the legal system of a tyrannical state.
Nonetheless, further elements of the indictment need to be
studied to be sure that there is nothing else to consider regarding
how More allegedly ran afoul of the words of the legislation and
committed high treason as defined in the Act of High Treason. The
fifth section of More's indictment 15 8 thinly contended that there
were written words betraying More's mind and therefore
constituted "word and deed" that offended the statute's coverage
pertaining to the King's title of Supreme Head of the Church.15 9
As the indictment stated, "More maliciously wrote to Bishop John
Fisher telling the cardinal of his own silence and calling the
legislation a two-edged sword."160 But these were words of an
astute lawyer explaining the effect of a law, rather than an
expression of his opinion about the King's title. It appeared that
Fisher and More did communicate in writing with one another
after their respective imprisonments in the Tower.161 In their
157 Id. § 2(c), at 188. More continued by asserting that the law made "no penalty for
silence." Id.
158 More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY supra note 18, § 5, at 17980.
159 Id.; 1534, 26 Hen. 8, c. 1 (Eng.).
160 More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY supra note 18, § 5, at 17980.
161 Most of the communication dealt with the respective good wishes for one another
or other personal matters, but nothing was said about the King's title or the Act of
Supremacy. See REYNOLDS, supra note 55, at 364; REYNOLDS, supra note 26, at 266-70,
275.
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exchange of notes (none of which survive), the subject matter of
the statutes was purportedly discussed hypothetically and was
considered to be like a two-edged sword: if a person did one thing
in accordance with the statute, he would condemn his soul to hell,
but, if a person did the opposite-i.e., he did nothing-then he
would be condemned to die a premature death. 162 But nothing was
said about the King and his title. 163
In short, the "two-edged sword" analogy was the Catch-22 of
this period in Tudor history.164 Even if the statement were
subscribed to by Fisher and More, it is inconceivable that the
wording could be construed as a denial or deprivation of the King's
title or name as Supreme Head of the Church in England. All that
Thomas More said in his June 3, 1535 Tower interrogation about
the Act of Supremacy was this:
[T]he [statute made in the Parliament] whereby the king's
Highness was made Supreme Head . . . [was like unto a
sword] with two edges, for if he said that the same law were
good, then [it] was dangerous to the soul. And if he said
contrary to the said statute, [then] it was death to the body.
Wherefore he would make thereto none other answer. 165
In fine, More said nothing to indicate his view about the
statute conferring the problematic title on the King. The
statement mentioning the "two-edged sword" did nothing to
deprive or deny the King of his self-imposed ecclesiastical title.
The indictment characterized the two-edged sword image
used by More in this way: "The act of Parliament . . . 'is like a

sword with two edges, for if a man answer one way it will
confound his soul, and if he answer the other way it will confound
his body."' 166 In this context, the indictment of More contended
that he communicated the "two-edge sword" concept to Bishop
162 Henry Ansgar Kelly, A ProceduralReview of Thomas More's Trial,
in THOMAS
MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY supra note 18, at 31-35.
163
I6

Id.
JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961). For those unfamiliar with the expression of

Joseph Heller's novel Catch 22, it is a theme he developed of a no-win situation. Id.
165 Tower Interrogation of More (June 3, 1535), in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY,
supra note 18, at 145.
166 More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18, § 5, at 179-

80.
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Fisher by correspondence carried from More to Fisher by George
Gold of the Tower staff. As a result of this "conspiratorial
communication," 16 7 it was argued that Fisher "falsely,
treasonously, and maliciously expressly refused to receive, accept,
and hold that the foresaid lord king was Supreme Head on earth
of the English Church."168 If this were true, by what deed or word
was this done? Again, the concern of this exchange was not the
expression of a word or the doing of an act that was forbidden by
the Act of High Treason and the Act of Supremacy as* read
together; rather, it was about silence, yet this silence was viewed
as the act of high treason.169 But once again, neither the Act of
Supremacy nor the Act of High Treason addressed silence. The
statutes only addressed deeds or words (spoken or written) that
would assert or could be construed to serve as a denial of the
king's title as Supreme Head of the Church. But no words, be they
spoken or written, were used or exchanged by More and Fisher
regarding the King's title. Had the Act of High Treason required
some kind of affirmation of the King's title which was responded
to by silence, then the construction of the statutes would be based
on an objective reading leading to the only conclusion that silence
was a treasonable offense if there were an affirmative duty to
accept by public declaration the King's title. However, this is not
what the wording of the statute required. What the statute
specified was a deprivation by words, and silence was not listed as
an indictable offense in the Act of High Treason-only deeds or
words that would deprive the King of his title.
When questioned further about the King's title on June 3, the
indictment asserted that More, once again, "maliciously

167 Id. § 6, at 180. In this element of the indictment, it was stated that More wrote
Fisher on May 26 warning the latter not to use the words dealing with the "two-edged
sword" "lest there appear to be a confederacy between them." Id. But even if the words
were adopted by Fisher, and the record suggests that they were, Id. § 7, these words do
not fall into any category as defined by the Act of High Treason. Moreover, Fisher's
adoption of the words "two-edged sword" used to describe the Act of High Treason does
not constitute any of the acts or deeds described by the high treason legislation. As this
element of More's indictment acknowledges, the interrogation of Fisher was responded
to with nothing as he "remained completely silent and was unwilling to give a direct
answer to it." Id. at 181.
168 Id.
§ 5, at 179.
169 Id.
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persevered in his silence." 170 Although it was contended by the
indictment that this further inaction of silence deprived the King
of a dignity, title, and name of his royal condition and generated
sedition and malignity in the hearts of true subjects, 171 neither the
language of the indictment nor the statement of silence
demonstrated how Thomas More's silence violated the Act of
Supremacy as implemented by the Act of High Treason. In other
words, the indictment failed to demonstrate how silence and the
words dealing with "the two-edged sword" fall within the scope of
the things prohibited by the Act of High Treason.
Silence is not words-written or spoken. Silence is nothing.172
As Shakespeare's King Lear reminds us, "Nothing will come of
nothing. Speak again." 173 Silence makes no statement that is
words-oral or written-which maliciously, or for that matter
innocently, wish or desire anything. Neither is silence an act,
which maliciously by craft imagines, invents, practices or
attempts any bodily harm or deprives anyone of a dignity, title, or
name or slanderously and maliciously publishes and pronounces
that someone is a heretic, schismatic, tyrant, infidel, or usurper of
the Crown. 174 Silence is not an act; it is inaction. Furthermore, it

§ 8, at 182.
Id.
172 Id. § 9. To the end of the indictment, the only statement (the only words)
which
could be solicited from Thomas More was this:
170 Id.
171

The law and statute whereby the king is made Supreme Head . . . be like a
sword with two edges; for, if a man say that the same laws be good, then it is
dangerous to the soul; and if he say contrary to the said statute, then it is
death to the body. Wherefore I will make thereunto none other answer,
because I will not be occasion of the shorting of my life.

Id.
173 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,

KING LEAR act 1, sc. 1, 1. 91 (Bill Raffel ed., Yale

University Press 2007). Lear is trying to get his daughter Cordelia to express her love
for him. Id. The other two daughters, Regan and Goneril, express false words of love,
which Lear interprets as sincere. Id. Cordelia knows this but cannot do the same as her
sisters. Id. Her reticence is noted by Lear who prompts her to speak as her sisters did.

Id.
174 Although no writing was extant in that the correspondence between More and
Fisher was burned after being read, More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY
JURY, supra note 18, § 10, at 183, no Tower official interrogated by the authorities
involved with the prosecution of Fisher and More was able to testify what was the
substance of the correspondence; therefore, the only evidence of what was contained in
these letters exchanged while both More and Fisher were imprisoned would be oral
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is an abstention that communicates nothing because it is nothing.
Silence is not a word, spoken or written, it is an absence of words.
Silence is no expression of a wish or desire, nor is it any kind of
malice dealing with actual or meditated harm to another, nor is it
a deprivation of any dignity, title, or name, nor is it calling
someone a hateful thing such as a heretic, schismatic, tyrant,
infidel, or usurper.175
This brings me to a further consideration of the role of silence
in the accusation against More and how the English law
considered its bearing in matters of assent or consent and,
therefore, guilt. 17 6 The role of consent-by word or deed-must
specifically be considered in the context of the two statutes that
were relied upon to convict More of high treason. But if consent
were not given by a person, it was erroneously assumed that the
statute's language would consider the failure to consent as a
means, by word or deed, of depriving the King of his title. Yet
Thomas More was correct in arguing the defense that silence did
not mean disagreement with the thing proposed; rather, he argued
that his silence was neither denial nor deprivation.
Under the common law of England at the time of Thomas
More's prosecution, silence had to be legally construed as an
implicit means of assenting to the thing asserted by the person
presenting the matter for which agreement or disagreement was
solicited.1 77 More pled the rule: "[q]ui tacet consentire videtur,"
that is, silence gives consent to the thing asserted or done. 178

evidence, but there was none. See Interrogations of Tower Servants (June 7-11, 1535),
in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18, at 150-57.
175 As one witness against John Fisher stated regarding their discussion in the
Tower, when presented with the statute Fisher noted to the witness that there was
nothing in the statute binding him to answer. Interrogations of Tower Servants (June
7-11, 1535), in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18, at 152.
176 When the question of More's silence was introduced at his trial, he stated,
To which I clearly respond to you that it is not lawful for me to be judged to
death [i.e., to be convicted of high treason] for such silence on my part,
because neither your statute nor anything in the laws of the whole world can
rightly afflict anyone with punishment, unless one has committed a crime in
word or deed, since laws have constituted no penalty for silence.
Guildhall Report, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18, § 2(c), at 188.
177 Id. § 4, at 189.
178 Id. A similar axiom was: qui tacet consentire videtur, ubi tractatur de eius
commodo, that is, he who is silent is considered as assenting, when his interest is at
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There was a variant of this principle within English law, which
stated: "qui tacet non utique fatetur, sed tamen verum est eum non
negare," that is, he who is silent does not indeed confess, but yet it
is true that he does not deny. 179
The key to answering the questions about the legal meaning
and relevance of silence lies within the fourth paragraph of More's
indictment. There was an effort to make the failure to take the
oath the same thing as plotting against the king, his titles, etc.
But the law regarding the oath and the failure to take the oath
was already disposed of in the attainder legislation relying upon
the misprision of treason doctrine. It was the attainder legislation
that dealt with silence by refusing to declare the oath and not the
Act of High Treason. Thus, the indictment incorrectly asserted
that silence was a violation of the Act of High Treason because
More
maliciously remained completely silent and refused to give a
direct response to that question [whether he, More, accepted
the king to be the Supreme Head on earth of the English
Church], and he spoke these following English words, namely,
'I will not meddle with any such matters, for I am fully
determined to serve God and to think upon His Passion and
my passage out of this world.'180
The Act of High Treason was silent about silence. In this
regard, Thomas More's silence was neutral about the proposition
offered by the state, since it was neither word asserting something
or deed doing something that could be considered a deprivation of
the king's title. In addition, his words, "I will not meddle with any
such matters," could only be regarded as a statement that he had
stake. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1414. Here, the interest at stake
may be that the outcome of the legal proceedings would determine whether More was
to be found guilty or not. If he were found guilty, he would die. Surely his interest was
at stake given this context. However, in another fashion, could it be argued that More
had a personal interest in whether King Henry was to be considered Supreme Head of
the Church? From a purely personal standpoint, this would probably not matter too
much; however, by making it necessary for subjects to assent to this assertion, the
temporal sovereign is the Supreme Head of the Church, it can then be said that anyone
who was pressed with this would have an interest that is at stake.
179

BIACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 25, at 1414.

18o More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18,
79.

§ 4,

at 178-
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no opinion on the matter, and therefore he could neither deny nor
deprive anything that properly belonged to the king. And his nonopinion was not addressed by the language of the Act of High
Treason, but only words and deeds maliciously depriving the king
of his title were violations.
The legislation necessitated some affirmative expression or
deed by the accused for a finding of high treason because the
statutory text required some kind of words that had the effect of
denying or depriving a title claimed by the king. As More's trial
progressed, no evidence, pertaining to deeds or words, was
presented demonstrating how he deprived the King of his title as
Supreme Head of the Church.181 No evidence was produced-with
the exception of Richard Rich's perjury in the trial of Thomas
More (which will be addressed in a moment)-demonstrating
thoughts pertaining to Parliament's competence to acknowledge
the King's assumed ecclesiastical title.182 It was reported in More's
indictment that there was an exchange between More and Sir
Richard Rich in the Tower on June 12, 1535.183 Beyond
pleasantries, the words between the two concerned various
hypotheticals regarding the competence of Parliament to pass
certain kinds of law. Now a few words are needed to dispose of
allegations that More did deprive the King of his ecclesiastical
title in his conversation with Rich.
Based on the objective evidence, both More and Rich were in
agreement that Parliament could enact legislation making
Richard Rich king of England. 184 Furthermore, both concurred
that it was beyond Parliament's authority to declare that God was
not God.185 Where the two departed company was on the so-called
middle case, concerning the competence of Parliament to make the
sovereign the Supreme Head of the Church in England.186 But as
181

Guildhall Report, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18,

§ 2(c),

at

More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18,

§ 11(d),

at

188.
182

184.

183 Id. § 11, at 183-85. Robert Bolt captured well this testimony in the play and
screenplay for A Man For All Seasons. See BOLT, supra note 16.
184 More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18, § 11(d), at
183-85; see also Roper, supra note 21, at 85-87.
185 More's Indictment, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18, § 11, at
183-85.
186

Id.
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things evolved, this middle case, viz. Parliament making the king
the head of the Church, was not considered in that there was
disagreement between More and Rich as to what constituted the
"middle case."18 7 According to More, what was discussed was
whether Parliament had the competence to make Richard Rich
pope. 188 Moreover, the account of the trial given by Will Roper, the
son-in-law of Thomas More, corroborated More's contention that
he said nothing about the king's supremacy of the church or the
Parliament's ability to legislate such a thing in the presence of
Richard Rich. 189
In recap, it was the Act of High Treason, relying on the title
conferred by the Act of Supremacy that was the key to the
prosecution of Sir Thomas More. In essence, in order to
understand on what words or deeds the claimed acts of high
treason rested, it was necessary to refer to the Act of Supremacy.
The Act of High Treason gave the teeth to the Act of Supremacy,
that is, it provided the means to punish anyone for doing
187 Richard Rich's Report on Thomas More (June 12, 1535), in THOMAS MORE'S
TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18, at 159. This prompted More to declare after his
conviction,

[I1f this oath of yours, Master Rich, be true, then pray I that I may never see
God in the face, which I would not say, were it otherwise, to win the whole
world . . . . In good faith, Master Rich, I am sorrier for your perjury than for
mine own peril, and you shall understand that neither I, nor no man else to
my knowledge, ever took you to be a man of such credit as in any matter of
importance I, or any other, would at any time vouchsafe to communicate with
you.
Roper, supranote 21, at 86; see also REYNOLDS, supra note 55, at 341-44.
188 Roper, supra note 21, at 83; see also REYNOLDS, supra note 55, at 341-44.
189Roper, supranote 21, at 87-89. Only after he was convicted did More express his
opposition to the legislation making the king the supreme head of the church.
Guildhall Report, in THOMAS MORE'S TRIAL BY JURY, supra note 18, § 8, at 191-92.
When he was presented with the evidence that many of England's ecclesiastical
officials disagreed with More, the defendant, stated in reply,
For one bishop who agrees with you, I have easily a hundred, including some
who are among the saints. And for your one Council [i.e., Parliament] and
your statute (what it is worth the great good God knows), on my side are all
the general councils celebrated during the last thousand years.
Id. § 10, at 192. As Peter Ackroyd's biography, Thomas More indicates, "It was not a
trial which More could have won." ACKROYD, supra note 55, at 399. As Ackroyd further
points out, the lack of corroboration by those who accompanied Rich to the Tower and
were present during the discussion between More and Rich intensifies the questions
about the reliability of Rich's testimony. Id. at 399-400.
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something contrary to the king's title acknowledged by the Act of
Supremacy. The two statutes worked in tandem: the first
providing the foundation for the offense, i.e., doing or saying
something contrary to the king's supremacy, and the second giving
the muscle to protect the dignity of the king and his title.
Once More realized that the legislation would be used as a
package deal-i.e., the Act of Supremacy and the Act of High
Treason being read together-he knew that he could not speak
about the king's title for that would be construed as some kind of
denial or deprivation of a dignity belonging to the king that the
legislation recognized. Thus, he chose the path of silence, which
would avoid doing anything that might be objectively construed as
a word or deed by the terms of this legislation. When pressed, he
offered the theoretical remark that laws can be like two-edged
swords, but nothing more was said and certainly nothing was said
or done that could be reasonably construed as a deprivation,
malicious or otherwise, of the king's title.
Upon consideration of the indictment and the two statutes
upon which it relied, one thing remains clear: Thomas More did
nothing and said nothing indicating that he intended to deny or
deprive the King of the title Supreme Head of the Church of
England in a malicious fashion.
IV. LESSONS FOR THE PRESENT AGE
In this Article, I have attempted to demonstrate the objective
meaning of the two statutes used to prosecute Thomas More on
the charge of high treason. I have also examined the meaning of
the auxiliary statutes enacted during the same period of Tudor
history dealing with "the King's great matter" to keep in mind
issues and concerns that might have had or did have a bearing on
the legislation used to address the division that occurred between
Sir Thomas More and King Henry VIII. It is patent that the
counts of the indictment against More, and the evidence presented
at More's trial, along with the theories upon which he was tried
did not address any real act or deed covered by either of the
statutes listed in the indictment. At most, his trial and
subsequent conviction proceeded on the basis that Thomas More's
silence was a manner of communicating positions on matters
covered by the Act of High Treason relying on the Act of
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Supremacy. However, as I have also demonstrated, More's silence
and anything that he actually said or wrote were not matters that
were covered by the Act of High Treason relying on the Act of
Supremacy. His silence and his words did not constitute any
opinion that deprived the King of his title as Supreme Head of the
Church. More's silence and the few words that he uttered which
were addressed in his indictment failed to meet the criteria of the
crime of high treason as defined in the Act of High Treason.
However, if the common law were to be relied upon as a means of
communicating a position on the king's title as Supreme Head of
the Church in England, then More's silence must be viewed as a
form of consent or assent to the title, not as an expression of
disagreement and, therefore, not a deprivation or denial of
Henry's self-conferred ecclesiastical title acknowledged by the Act
of Supremacy.
While the events surrounding the promulgation and
application of the Act of High Treason and the Act of Supremacy
in England occurred almost five hundred years ago, they contain
important lessons today for legislators, administrators, judges,
lawyers, and citizens (or subjects). Statutes are an important part
of our societies and of our seeking to protect and to advance the
common good. But the formulation of legislation necessitates
careful selection of words that properly and morally address the
"mischief' necessitating legislative action. In essence, their
meaning should be readily discernable by both citizen and public
official. The passage of almost half a millennium does not in any
way detract from this principle, which I have presented in the
context of the legislation used to prosecute and execute Thomas
More-a man who lived by the rule of law. Given the world that
confronts us in the early twenty-first century where legislation
has sometimes become the tool once again to advance special
interests rather than the common good, the principle is all the
more important. I offer this thought in the context of four lessons
that emerge from the meaning of the statutes used to prosecute
Thomas More.
The first lesson is that it is vital to know the mischief (if any)
or, better yet, the motivation, which serves as the catalyst for the
statute's enactment. This is critical to the task of statutory
interpretation. It presents an important context on why legislators
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are doing something essential to further the common good.
Putting aside the passage of private bills, which clearly are
enacted to address matters dealing with specific persons,
legislation is typically promulgated to address societal issues and
applied generally to the entire population for its general welfare.
The second lesson is this: understanding the context of the
surrounding circumstances which energized the legislature into
promulgating a statute is relevant to an examination of statutory
law and its meaning. Once the motivation for the enactment
becomes clear, and the words selected have been given objective
definitions, examining the syntax used is essential so that the
reader can best determine how this new law will address the
"mischief' that threatens the common good. Questions can and do
emerge about why some words were ultimately chosen and others
were not selected for incorporation into the statute. The
consideration by the interpreter of these linguistic options is
generally instructive because it can rule out meanings or include
meanings that might initially escape the interpreter's cursory
parsing of the text.
Once these two lessons are in place, a third lesson should
follow. The interpreter is now in a position to ask how the
ultimate formulation of the statutory language can best further
the common good, i.e., how does it promote the beneficial interests
of the commonweal. This is an important task in that it assists the
interpreter to exclude those possible meanings, which might
actually frustrate the protection of the common good and promote
new forms of mischief. I would argue that this is precisely what
occurred in the interpretation and misapplication of the Act of
High Treason and the Act of Supremacy to Thomas More.
In the final analysis, it is the task of statutory law to advance
the general welfare of the nation by promoting and protecting the
common good. While the promulgation of statutes can promote
other legitimate objectives, this is the one primary purpose for
which they exist. This is why the fourth and final lesson is so
important: if the interpreter realizes that the legislation does not
promote the common good and the welfare of the commonwealth,
how should the text's meaning be explained? Here I return to my
definition of the rule of law, which I proposed at the outset of this
Article, that will help answer this question: is the statute founded
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on the use of objective reason, that is, the application of human
intelligence that comprehends the intelligible reality which
provides the best normative guidance for the welfare of society
and the promotion of the common good? If not, might it be argued
that the statute is mischief itself rather than a remedy for
mischief? Here we need to be mindful of the wisdom of Augustine
of Hippo and relied upon by Martin Luther King, Jr. that an
unjust law is no law at all.190
I hope that this Article demonstrates that these lessons, if
kept in mind by public official and citizen alike, lead us to the
conclusion that there was something wrong with the statutes
Henry VIII urged his Parliament to enact regarding "the King's
great matter." In addition, there were grave problems in how
these statutes were interpreted and applied in the prosecution of
Thomas More. These are valuable lessons for the present age,
which ought not to be forgotten.
Although the development of the legislative process in
England was surely an important development in the rule of law,
as I have explained that concept earlier in this Article, the
legislative process can be commandeered by the totalitarian and
dictatorial influences, which give birth to or sustain the tyrannical
state. That is what happened in England under the reign of Henry
VIII when he commandeered Parliament to implement his will by
law that was designed to serve his own interests and little else. It
might be said that the parliamentary system of England in the
first half of the sixteenth century was a development in the
experiment of democracy-insofar as some members of society had
a representative voice in the law making process. Although
democracy as we know it in the twenty-first century may have
been a considerable distance in the future, we can still learn
another lesson from Henry's legislation discussed in this Article:
when democracies relinquish the duty to promote the common
good and seek, instead, to establish a society in which "passive
obedience" demanding "full cooperation," or else, from the citizensubjects, they transform into the totalitarian state. 19 1 This is what
- Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
835, 840 (1993).
19 CHRISTIANITY AND EUROPEAN CULTURE: SELECTIONS FROM THE WORK OF
CHRISTOPHER DAWSON 81 (Gerald J. Russello ed., 1998). Interestingly, Pope John Paul
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faithful subjects like Thomas More, John Fisher, and others
experienced in Tudor England in the early sixteenth century. In
his own way, Thomas More recognized that what should have
been a benevolent government had become a tyranny when he
wrote to his daughter Margaret from the Tower, "I do nobody
harm, I say none harm, I think none harm, but wish everybody
good. And if this be not enough to keep a man alive, in good faith,
I long not to live."1 9 2
In the end, the laws which Henry had Parliament enact did
not promote the common good and advance the welfare of the
commonwealth. In fact, they did just the opposite. Rather than
promoting an authentic justice, these statutes and their
application advanced terror by which some profited but many in
the commonweal did not. This is why Saint Augustine cautioned
so long ago that kingdoms without justice are nothing more than
bands of robbers. 193 Justice must reside in the words of legislation
and their subsequent interpretation and application. If not, the
state-regardless of the time in which it exists-becomes the band
that robs citizens and subjects of the authentic rule of law. This is
yet another lesson for the present age.

II had this to say of democracy: "As history demonstrates, a democracy without values
easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism." POPE JOHN PAUL II, ON THE
HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF RERUM NOVARUM: CENTESIMUs ANNUS

46, at 89

(Encyclical Letter May 1, 1991).
192 Letter from Thomas More to Margaret Roper (May 2 or 3, 1535), in FOR ALL
SEASONS: SELECTED LETTERS OF THOMAS MORE, supra note 120, at 288.
193 2 SAINT AUGUSTINE: THE CITY OF GOD AGAINST THE PAGANS 17 (William M.
Green trans., 1903).
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